

# National Association of Probation Executives EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE

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## PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

In this, my 37th year of probation service and my last year as President of the National Association of Probation Executive (NAPE), I take this opportunity to reflect on what I believe to be the greatest challenge facing probation executives today. This challenge, changing the entrenched culture of our organization, was and remains of paramount importance to me in my role as a Probation Administrator charged with leading the introduction and implementation of evidence-based practices (EBP) into Nebraska's Probation System. Of equal importance is the pivotal role networking with my fellow executives has played in meeting this challenge.

So many of us who are currently in leadership positions rose, as I did, through the ranks of our state's criminal and/or juvenile justice system where we served in various positions. Always driven by a desire to do a good job, we generally weren't subject to complying with explicit mission statements, but rather adhered to the collective beliefs of our superiors who we believed in and followed. The cultures of our organizations generally were revealed in the personal and professional characteristics of our boss, our leader. Unless of course, the person in charge wasn't a leader then the culture seemed to be reflective of the good or bad values and behaviors of the employees rather than the organization.

With the introduction of evidence-based practices and principles in the late 1990s came the realization that mission statements needed to be re-crafted and probation leaders needed to align organizational structures and operations to reflect the goals of those statements. Organizational culture change required bringing the practices, and values and beliefs of the leaders and employees in line with the priorities delineated in the organization's mission statement. New "workplace norms" were necessary. New "workplace roles" needed to be created. Staff

needed to intimately understand why the change was necessary.

Leaders, managers, and supervisors had to question their own way of doing business in terms of whether their own values and behaviors were aligned with the EBP way of doing business. Resistance to change is and



was not limited to line staff. Leaders were not only required to re-examine their own beliefs, but, in many instances, commit to a new way of both thinking and leading. This was not easy. It's been said that attempting to change the culture of an organization is similar to trying to change the course of a river. It's no easy task. But with the commitment of all of the organization's leadership to the new way of doing business, as well as an organizational plan for change that engages and incorporates the people of the organization, along with the rules and tools to carry out the new plan, the change will have a good chance at being successful.

With the advent of EBP-inspired mission statements, probation executives continually adjust and re-adjust their operational plans. The level of engagement executives spend with their staffs has been intensified as it has become more and more important to keep an eye on the pulse of the organization and keep an ear to the ground, carefully listening to the people who will ultimately define the success or failure of the plan. Probation executives will continue to face the immense challenge of leading organizational change as our organizations become more fluid and viable.

Fortunately, NAPE and our sister professional organizations are committed to supporting probation leaders through change management by providing the latest research, professional experience, and best practice information available to them. Networking with each other in both formal and informal ways is enormously valuable as well. During my first years as Probation Administra-

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### **PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE (cont'd)**

tor, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) provided funding and facilitation for a yearly meeting of both probation and parole administrators with statewide authority to discuss what was and what was not working in their state and seek new innovative ideas in moving forward. I will forever be grateful for the guidance, wisdom, and shared experience my colleagues provided as I vented about overcoming the barriers to implementing cultural change then and throughout the years that followed. The professional benefit of providing a venue for stimulating discussion and support is immeasurable. Unfortunately, NIC discontinued funding of this network two years ago. I would encourage any of you who have an opportunity to voice to NIC what you've heard about the value of this network to advocate for its resurgence.

On a companion note, Bill Burrell wrote an article some time ago entitled "Implementation: The Achilles Heel of Evidence-Based Practices" that appears in this edition of the *Executive Exchange*. This article more than adequately speaks, not only to change, but to all the elements necessary to successfully implement evidence-based principles and practices within an organization charged with delivering juvenile or adult probation services. Those elements are: leadership, environmental factors, staff, training and technical assistance, communication, change agent, integration, resources, time, and fidelity.

I remember the day this article came across my desk. It was several years into Nebraska probation's transformation to evidence-based practices, but I'd thought I'd died

and gone to heaven because Bill had written about all of the areas and challenges we had only painstakingly stumbled upon as necessary to create a successful change plan. That article not only validated Nebraska probation's efforts and supported our moving forward, it created a meaningful guide for all probation executives trying to implement evidence-based principles and practices in their jurisdictions.

This article, a road map for implementing change, is reprinted with permission from its author and original publisher. I encourage every administrator working within the field of community corrections today to read it and make copies for their staffs.

I also encourage every probation administrator to utilize NAPE, NIC, the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA), the National Juvenile Court Services Association (NJCSA), and their colleagues and other professional associations both within and outside of their state for advice, shared experience, or simply information. Facing all of the professional challenges associated with leading organizational change becomes less arduous and perplexing when supported by others.

In closing, thank you for the opportunity to serve our membership these last two years. It has been my privilege to represent you.

**Ellen Fabian Brokofsky**  
President  
Nebraska State Probation Administrator

### **INFORMATION ABOUT EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE**

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## IMPLEMENTATION: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES

by

William D. Burrell

The field of community corrections has been dabbling at the edges of significant organizational change now for a little more than a decade. Since the emergence of the *what works* research in the early to mid 1990s, managers and executives have talked about and attended workshops on *what works* and some have even attempted to implement programs based on this body of research. Relabeled *evidence-based practices* (EBP) just after the turn of the millennium, this research and the programs based on it still maintain a significant hold on the attention of probation and parole executives and managers.

Unfortunately, the fascination that many have with EBP has not translated into action commensurate with the rhetoric. Far too few agencies have been successful at implementing EBP in probation and parole. As a result, we have but a handful of examples we can point to in order to demonstrate that EBP works in community corrections and that it reduces crime committed by persons under supervision in the community.

This lack of evidence concerns me a great deal. I believe that we have a limited window of opportunity to implement EBP and demonstrate its impact. As with so many other program innovations, management fads, and political trends, the fascination with EBP and the opportunity that it provides will not last forever. As the word gets out about EBP and its tremendous potential for reducing the risk of reoffending, expectations begin to build for an evidence-based future:

- Crime by probationers and parolees will decline;
- Drug use will decrease;
- Employment and school attendance will increase;
- Criminogenic risk factors of all types will be mitigated; and
- Law-abiding, pro-social behavior will replace criminal and delinquent acts.

I believe that all of these developments can happen, if we have widespread, high-quality implementation of EBP in adult and juvenile probation and parole agencies across the country. Unfortunately, we have not seen such widespread adoption of EBP.

### Great Expectations

The excitement and expectations generated by EBP have been good for community corrections. We have been able to put aside the crippling (and mistaken) notion that when it comes to changing offender behavior, nothing works. The demise of the rehabilitative ideal (Allen, 1981) contributed to a two-decade-long crisis of identity and mission in community corrections. The core ideology of helping offenders to change was ripped away, because programs and strategies to facilitate offender rehabilitation supposedly did not work. We struggled to find our place in the “get tough; lock ‘em up” era. With extensive research to support it, EBP has breathed new life into correctional treatment and once again given probation and parole a viable and vital mission.

The excitement surrounding EBP has a limited shelf life, however. The expectations created (by us and others) must soon be

met with empirical evidence about results. Absent widespread evidence that we have implemented EBP and that it is producing positive results, disillusionment will set in, and the window of opportunity will slam shut. Policy makers, stakeholders, constituents, and even staff will say, “Where’s the beef?” Without the “beef” (i.e., tangible results), EBP will be tossed onto the trash heap of failed initiatives and programs.

The tragedy of this scenario is that it does not need to happen: EBP should not be relegated to the public policy trash heap as ineffective. The empirical evidence to the contrary is significant and substantial. Community corrections executives and managers need to embrace EBP and implement programs and services on a much larger scale. It is time to match the rhetoric with results!

### Why Isn’t EBP the Standard Practice?

Why EBP is not standard operating procedure is a complex question, with several possible answers:

Some community corrections personnel have lingering political and policy questions about EBP. In some jurisdictions, there are still individuals in positions of authority and influence who want to lock everyone up. In such places, is it safe to embrace offender behavior change as an agency goal? Changing offender behavior is a difficult challenge to meet, and it is understandable that one might be reluctant to embrace a model that is in direct conflict with prevailing sentiment. Still, the evidence is compelling that we can reduce recidivism by offenders in the community.

Some in the field remain skeptical that any effort at rehabilitation can work. High-profile efforts like New York’s Project Greenlight (Wilson & Davies, 2006), in which parolees in the program had higher recidivism rates than the control group that got no treatment, provide fuel for these skeptics. Others do not place much faith in research, preferring instead to be guided by their own experience (an approach sometimes referred to as practice-based evidence).

Fortunately, many in leadership positions in community corrections agree that EBP is the right path and accept the evidence that programs based on this research do in fact work. Having reached these conclusions, they now face the biggest challenge of EBP: that of implementation of EBP programs in their agencies.

### The Implementation Challenge

“Implementation” is a word that is tossed around very cavalierly in our field (and in many others as well). From the casual references, one would think that designing (or finding) an evidence-based program is the bulk of the work and that implementation is a relatively minor matter. In fact, it is the reverse. In their synthesis of implementation research, scholars at the National Implementation Research Network concluded that “implementation is a decidedly complex endeavor, more complex than the policies, programs, procedures, techniques,

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or technologies that are the subject of the implementation efforts" (Fixen et al., 2005, p. 2). To compound the problem, the implementation researchers note that the science relating to implementation lags far behind that of developing and testing evidence-based practices (Fixen et al., 2005, p. vi). Most of the knowledge from implementation research addresses the early stages: exploration and early implementation. Much more needs to be learned about sustaining implementation for the long term.

Implementation is critical because new programs, EBP or otherwise, are not, to use a contemporary electronics term, "plug and play." Unlike my computer, which recognizes whatever device I plug into the USB port, organizations need a great deal of help recognizing and figuring out how to run these new programs. As Joan Petersilia (1990) noted, "...ideas embodied in innovative social programs are not self-executing. It is now well-recognized that implementing change is neither an easy nor an entirely predictable process" (p. 129). It involves much more than just finding a "model" program and adopting it for your agency.

To meet the implementation challenge, it is useful to understand exactly what it entails. Implementation is defined as "A series of activities designed to put into practice an activity or program of known dimensions" (Fixen et al., 2005, p. 5). It is a purposeful process, one that will result in changes in professional *behavior of staff*, in *organizational structure and culture*, and in *relationships* to clients, stakeholders, and system partners (Fixen et al., 2005, p. 12).

Implementation of EBP is a planned organizational change. Successful organizational change efforts have two essential components. The first is a proven idea or concept that will be the focus of the change. In this discussion, I will refer to this component as the *intervention*. Evidence-based practices in community corrections are interventions that have proven their ability to produce the desired results: reduced recidivism. The second component is the *implementation* of the intervention. Both components are essential to success. One without the other is insufficient (Fixen et al., 2005, p. 2). As a review of juvenile EBP implementation noted, "A sound program will not produce the desired results if it is implemented poorly" (Mihalic et al., 2004, p. 1). Combining the two key components with a simple rating of effective or ineffective provides a useful way of displaying the results of planned change efforts, as Figure 1 illustrates. Planned change efforts can be assigned to one of four cells, based on the rating of the two components. For example, a program that had a good design but was poorly implemented would fall into Cell 1, labeled "Try Again." In such a situation, efforts should be focused on improving the implementation to improve the overall outcome. A program like New York's Project Greenlight would fall into Cell 1 (Wilson & Davies, 2006). Cell 2 is where a program with a good design and good implementation would fall. An example of such a program would be the Intensive Supervision Program operated by Probation Services in New Jersey (Pearson, 1987).

Cell 3, labeled "Forget About It," is where programs with poor design and poor implementation go. The Scared Straight program operated in New Jersey's Rahway State Prison is one example of such a program. Not only was the design of trying to scare juveniles out of offending ineffective, but there was also no control over what types of juveniles were sent to the program. The results showed that not only did Scared Straight not reduce delinquency, but in some cases it increased delinquency (Finckenaer, 1981). Cell 4 holds program like boot camps. As a result

of the attention of the federal government to these programs in the 1990s, a great deal of research was done on them. Research found that in boot camps, implementation was very good overall. Boot camps were not effective in reducing incarceration or in reducing recidivism, however (MacKenzie, 2006). From such results, we can add to our knowledge base about effective programs, so Cell 4 is labeled "Learned Something."

**Figure 1**  
**Planned Change Outcomes**

<b>Intervention</b>	<i>Effective</i>	#1 Try Again	#2 Success
	<i>Ineffective</i>	#3 Forget About It	#4 Learned Something
		<i>Ineffective</i>	<i>Effective</i>
<b>Implementation</b>			

### Figuring Out What Works

There is a great deal of information to help in identifying a "good" intervention. The literature on effective programs is substantial, perhaps even a bit overwhelming, but there are plenty of choices and people who can help. Issues to be considered include:

- Matching the offenders and their needs to the program;
- Matching the program to the resources available; and
- Ensuring that staff have or can acquire the capabilities and skills to execute the program faithfully.

The articles and training on EPB in corrections have proliferated over the last decade and have raised the awareness of probation and parole practitioners, enabling them to better sort through the myriad issues and information available.

Implementation is another matter. The "profile" of implementation as a critical issue in organizational change has not risen to the level of information about EBP programs. Paul Gendreau and his colleagues have noted that the extensive literature on *technology transfer*, another term for implementation of new programs, has been largely ignored in the corrections literature (Gendreau et al., 2001, p. 248). As a result, practitioners are not as familiar with the terminology, concepts, and strategies in this field. By contrast, technology transfer has been addressed in some depth in the substance abuse treatment literature (Burrell, 2005). Perhaps we can learn some lessons from this and other fields.

### Components of Successful Implementation

While the subject of implementation has not been explored extensively in community corrections, it is not that difficult to locate relevant literature. What follows is a summary of the key components of successful implementation, organized by major categories.

*Leadership.* All studies of implementation emphasize the importance of effective leadership. There must be visible commit-

ment to the new program from the top of the organization. The involvement of leaders must extend beyond the normal, day-to-day activities of management and include regular involvement of the organization's leaders in the implementation process. It is essential that the agency leadership fully understand the new program and be able to discuss and defend it effectively. Leaders must be flexible, adaptable, and open to change. It is a given that the organization and its people will have to change as part of the implementation, and the leader must accept that inevitability and set the example. Leaders must be able to motivate staff and forge a shared vision.

*Environmental Factors.* The new program will not be placed in a vacuum. Attention must be paid to the environment in which implementation will occur. "Put simply, failing to adapt to the challenges of the local context is a common cause of failure" (Berman et al., 2007, p. 9). There must be a fit between the intervention and the agency. The intervention must meet a real need in the agency. Implementation must be feasible: the organization must be ready for change and have the capability to implement change. The agency should be stable — not in the midst of a crisis or other disruption. The rate of staff turnover should be low. There should be support from key stakeholders and constituents. Justice system partners should be alerted and involved to the extent that the program involves their operations or staff. These and many other environmental factors should be monitored throughout the implementation period, because these factors are dynamic and subject to change.

*Staff.* In community corrections, staff members are the intervention. They provide the services to the offenders, the courts, and the community. As a result, they are a critical component of implementation. There must be enough staff, with the proper skills, experience, and credentials. They must have a manageable workload, so that they have enough time to deliver the intervention. It is important to build what Harris and Smith (1996) call "street level commitment" among the line personnel (p. 210). Building this kind of commitment can be done through:

- Training;
- Involvement in the design and development of the program and policies;
- Opportunities to discuss both the program and the implementation; and
- Ongoing feedback on performance.

Staff must have the chance to make the intervention their own; they can not effectively be coerced. Management should find incentives to encourage staff to maintain the integrity of the intervention. It is helpful for staff to have regular access to the change agent and to technical assistance or training as needed. Such access will help to increase their comfort level and competence, leading to greater buy-in and support.

*Training and Technical Assistance.* Since the implementation of a new intervention will require changes in the professional behavior of staff, training is essential. A well-trained staff is more likely to implement the intervention fully, with greater fidelity to the design, and greater fidelity produces better outcomes (Mihalic et al., 2004, p. 7). It is important to offer "booster" training for staff after the initial training, to strengthen skills and reinforce learning (Sachwald & Eley, 2007, p. 32). Training should be followed by ongoing monitoring, supervision, coaching, and support. The organization must provide the infrastructure for this training, supervision, coaching, and feedback. In all likelihood, the extent

of these activities during implementation will be greater than in normal operations, and the workload of supervisors must reflect these additional responsibilities. Training should not be limited to line officers. The presence of managers and executives at the training sessions is significant. It sends a powerful message of support, increases their understanding of the intervention, and enables the administration to better understand and support the implementation at all levels of the agency. Technical assistance should be available from subject-matter experts, such as academics, evaluators, or others with specialized and detailed knowledge of the intervention and implementation. Answering staff members' questions and explaining concepts that they are curious about will raise their comfort levels, increase their competence, and enhance the likelihood of compliance with the requirements of the intervention.

*Communication.* Communication should be the easiest component to address, but in practice it may be the hardest. Noted change expert John Kotter (1996) says that managers undercommunicate about change, often to a significant degree. It is essential that all staff be informed about what is going to happen in the agency, before the process begins. This communication must take place before any training occurs, to give staff the context for the new skills that they will be learning. Orientation sessions should be conducted, introducing the initiative, describing the plans, reviewing key elements of the program, exploring staff members' roles and any changes in their duties, and allowing staff the opportunity to ask questions and raise concerns. Once the program is underway, managers should provide regular feedback on the progress of implementation and overall outcomes. Note that all of these steps must be taken in addition to day-to-day operations, further stressing the system and those who manage it.

*Change Agent.* The implementation should be led by a change agent, a project director with the authority to make things happen. The lines of authority and accountability should be clear; there should be no question about who is in charge of the implementation. The change agent must have strong support from the top, intimate knowledge of the organization and the program, professional credibility, and, ideally, prior success at managing change. The change agent should also have a team that is broadly representative of the agency. The team should consist of a vertical slice of the organization, with representation from all levels (management, supervisors, line officers, and support staff). Change is led most effectively by a team with special authority, working outside the day-to-day management structure (National Implementation Network, 2006).

*Integration.* The intervention must be integrated into the fabric of the agency if it is to survive and thrive in the long term. Programs that are merely "tacked on" to an agency run the risk of being targeted when budgets tighten, or of being neglected once the initial thrill of implementation has given way to the more mundane tasks of daily operations. Once the special status of the program erodes, it becomes harder to keep staff focused on maintaining the integrity of the model and the implementation. Once the focus is lost, outcomes will suffer. It is optimal that the impetus for the change come from within, rather than be imposed from the outside. Agencies have greater ownership of internally driven change. The intervention should have clear goals and objectives, and those should be closely aligned with the organization's goals and objectives.

*Resources.* It is foolhardy to launch a change effort without adequate resources. A project launched under those circum-

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stances is doomed from the start. It is wiser either to postpone implementation until sufficient resources can be obtained or to opt out altogether. Insufficient resources will cause compromises to be made, in either the program design or the implementation or both. Compromising design or implementation is a clear recipe for disappointment at best and outright failure at worst. Because we are dealing with criminal offenders and trying to change their offending behaviors, failure means new crimes — and new victims. In some instances, the poor performance of a program not only fails to reduce reoffending, it increases it (Wilson & Davies, 2006). It is unconscionable to proceed with implementation without adequate resources.

*Time.* Organizational change takes time. It can not be rushed or fast-tracked. While the specific time frames may vary based on the scope of the change and the agency's readiness for change, experts agree that it will take between two and four years for major change to take hold and survive in an agency (National Implementation Network, 2006). The experience of two states with implementation of EBP bears this out. Both Connecticut and Maryland spent five to six years at implementation, and both produced solid results (Fox et al., 2005; Taxman et al., 2006).

*Fidelity.* While last in the list of components, fidelity may be the most important. Fidelity refers to adherence to the program design. In other words, staff members who are delivering the intervention on the ground should be following the policies, procedures, and requirements called for in the program model. Fidelity means, in the words of Harris and Smith (1996), that the enacted design is the same as the conceptualized design (p. 184). Fidelity is a challenge, because myriad pressures are brought to bear when a model program is being implemented. New York's Project Greenlight is a good example, in which modifications were made to a sound EBP design as a result of fiscal, organizational, and administrative pressures (Wilson, 2007). As a result, the Greenlight program as delivered departed significantly from the original concept. As noted above, the results showed increased, not reduced, recidivism. A cursory review of this program could lead one to say that the EBP model does not work. In reality, one can not draw that conclusion because the EBP model was not implemented with fidelity in Project Greenlight. Instead, one can accurately conclude that the program was poorly implemented.

### Exploring the Domains of Fidelity

The EBP research is clear that fidelity should be a major concern when replicating programs in an agency. It is natural to expect that a well-researched and successful program will produce similar results if replicated in another location. That expectation can be met only if the model program is implemented with a high degree of fidelity to the original design, however.

When we start to explore this concept of fidelity, several additional dimensions emerge beyond compliance with the program model. I have labeled these the four domains of fidelity. Executives and managers in charge of planned change efforts must pay attention to all four domains.

**Figure 2**  
**The Four Domains of Fidelity**

	Design/Adoption	Execution
Intervention Program/Strategy	<b>Domain #1</b>	<b>Domain #2</b>
Implementation Strategy/Plan	<b>Domain #3</b>	<b>Domain #4</b>

The first domain is the *program design/adoption*. We must be sure that the model is evidence based and incorporates all of the key principles of the model. In other words, the program model should have a high degree of fidelity to the EBP model. To borrow a phrase from the business world, we must practice "due diligence" when we start looking for an EBP program to meet a local need. One criticism of Project Greenlight is that the Reasoning and Rehabilitation program may not have been examined closely enough from the cultural perspective. Some question whether the program is suited to the urban minority offender population that filled Project Greenlight (Wilson & Davies, 2006, p. 329).

The second domain has to do with *maintaining that program design fidelity during implementation*. The pressures of implementation can not be allowed to distort the model. Again, Project Greenlight is illustrative. The program stopped using the Level of Service Inventory-Revised assessment instrument and fundamentally modified the Reasoning and Rehabilitation cognitive behavioral program. These are key elements of an EBP model, and they were not maintained as required by the program design. Implementation researchers repeatedly caution not to change the program, but rather to look at how the organization might be modified to accommodate the model program (National Implementation Network, 2006).

The third domain is the *implementation design*. A comprehensive plan covering all of the components discussed above must be developed. Detailed tasks, time frames, and responsible parties must be identified. Failing to plan out a complex process such as organizational change invites disaster. There are so many moving parts and critical factors that a comprehensive plan is essential to ensure that they all work in concert. Implementation research can help the chances of success, but only if we incorporate available knowledge about effective implementation — another category of *what works* research!

The fourth domain is the *integrity of the implementation process*. The execution of the implementation plan must have fidelity as well. All of the tasks must be performed in the proper sequence and at the proper level. Without implementation fidelity, we can not be sure that our program model has been fully installed in the agency. Our ability to determine the impact of the intervention will be compromised. With the cost, in both financial and human terms, of organizational change, we need to be able to assess the impact of the change.

The third and fourth domains represent a less well explored aspect of fidelity in the context of EBP in community corrections. But as should be clear, it is a critical aspect. As Gendreau and his colleagues (1999) note, "The effectiveness of any state-of-the-art assessment and treatment protocol is diminished, however, if

careful attention is not paid as to how the programs are implemented in the first place" (p. 180).

### Big Investment, Huge Returns

It is clear that EBP holds great potential for transforming the work and the outcomes of probation and parole. We need to redouble our efforts to achieve that potential. The challenge is implementation. While implementation is hard work, it is something that will, in the long run, be worth the effort. As Don Andrews (2005) recently noted, EBP "may continue to be underutilized and of reduced value if the problems of implementation and integrity are not better addressed." We should not allow EBP to be underutilized and its value reduced. Too much is at stake.

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## GOVERNING SCIENCE

by

Malcolm K. Sparrow, Ph.D.

Among the many important tasks to be managed by probation executives is that of establishing the role for research in the organizations they lead, along with the related task of calibrating the appropriate relationship between the probation organization and research-oriented entities such as universities and think-tanks. It is a vexed topic. All experienced probation administrators understand that a full commitment to research is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the organization can really gain by learning more about “what works,” for and in their agency, but on the other hand evaluative research can give the agency a public “black eye” if it reflects poorly on the agency’s capacity and effectiveness.

There is the additional linguistic problem: academics and practitioners often speak dramatically different languages, by dint of different training and different professional priorities. Closing this gap in understanding is the key to establishing fruitful research partnerships.

Malcolm Sparrow adds considerably to the task of promoting successful partnerships in the following piece — “Governing Science.” As a former police practitioner in an earlier life, he is very discerning about the ways in which the conventions of the academic research are often a poor fit for the practitioner world, a disconnect that tends to discourage otherwise open-minded agency heads. But he also describes a way out of this conflict, by advocating for a broader vision of the way in which researchers can aid practitioners, calling for a more flexible use of various research models — even if those models do not meet the gold standard called for by the purists — and a greater sensitivity to the practical needs of agencies for shorter feedback loops.

What is now needed is for a probation executive to step forward and offer the same sensible call to fellow practitioners to find better ways for working with the research world, thereby closing the comprehension gap so usefully delineated by Sparrow.

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### Introduction

A favorite family pastime is to discover road signs that, either through ambiguous wording or lack of punctuation, lend themselves to multiple different interpretations. One of my daughter’s favorites has always been:

SLOW  
CHILDREN

If read as presumably intended, the sign warns motorists there might be children nearby, and SLOW is a command. But my daughter points out that SLOW could be an adjective instead: Perhaps motorists should allow more time for the (slower) children to get out of the way. And, she says, if this appeared outside the headmaster’s office rather than by the side of the road, it might be a reminder to the children themselves to conduct themselves with decorum and not go tearing around.

Likewise, the title of this paper — *Governing Science* — could suggest three different meanings in the context of policing. Perhaps the word *governing* is an adjective, in which case it would be the *science* that is doing the governing. Then the object might be to explore and define the science that should govern police as they consider how to conduct their business.

A second interpretation could be that *governing science* is a job to be done, with perhaps a hint that science (or scientists) might need to be controlled or restrained. In the context of policing, a discussion along these lines might set appropriate limits for the role of science and the influence of scientists.

A third possible interpretation arises from reading the phrase *governing science* the same way we read the phrases *fishing tackle* and *climbing gear*. There is a challenge to be met: to catch fish, or to conquer mountains, or to provide quality democratic governance. Through years of accumulated experience and often painful experimentation, those facing the challenge develop a sense of *needs*. To meet those needs, they invent or design various types of *tackle* (for fishing), *gear* (for climbing), or *science* (for governing) to help get the job done. If we wanted to know what the *science for governing* was that might improve the quality of life in a democracy, we would first focus on clarifying the role for police within the broader frame of democratic governance; second, we would define the types of science and areas of application that might best serve in support.

David Weisburd and Peter Neyroud have presented a paper in this series, titled “Police Science.”<sup>1</sup> Their subject, broadly viewed, covers the merits of closer collaboration between the fields of policing and scholarship. Anyone who cares about policing cherishes that collaboration enormously. It has already delivered considerable benefits for policing and is poised to deliver many more. Everyone should want that relationship to flourish. However, at this time, the relationship remains fragile, and much harm might be done if we accept a vision for the future of the relationship that is somehow misguided, inappropriate or off-base.

### The Evidence-Based Policing Movement

Despite their very broad title, Weisburd and Neyroud (hereafter W&N) echo many of the familiar themes of the *evidence-based policing* movement (hereafter EBP), which espouses a very particular vision of how the relationship between scholars and police should work. In presenting their diagnosis of how and why the relationship currently fails, W&N emphasize the following five major points:



1. They observe a “fundamental disjuncture between science and policing.”<sup>2</sup> The “evidence-based model for developing practices and policies has not been widely adopted by police agencies.”<sup>3</sup>
2. Why not? In their view, mostly because “police agencies have little interest in using scientific methods to evaluate programs and practices,”<sup>4</sup> and police generally implement strategies, therefore, “with little reference to research evidence.”<sup>5</sup> W&N describe “the lack of value of science in much of the policing industry”<sup>6</sup> and suggest that, in the future, police “will have to take science seriously.”<sup>7</sup>
3. W&N contrast the police profession with other professions — particularly medicine and public health — that have huge research infrastructures and substantial levels of government-funding to support research. As a result of these disparities in attention to science, W&N state that medical practice is now based soundly on scientifically validated practices, whereas policing is not.
4. W&N focus mainly on two types of science relevant to policing. One is *social science research* (which includes *criminology*), and the other involves *new technologies* arising from advances in natural sciences and engineering (e.g., DNA, computer forensics, and surveillance).<sup>8</sup> They regard the police profession as insufficiently concerned with social science research and overly eager to adopt new devices and technologies, even without properly evaluating their efficacy.<sup>9</sup>
5. W&N conclude that “a radical reformation of the role of science in policing will be necessary if policing is to become an arena of evidence-based policies.”<sup>10</sup> Their proposed solution is to “shift ownership of police science from the universities to police agencies,”<sup>11</sup> and they provide various suggestions as to how that might happen. One thing they suggest is a “committed percentage of police spending devoted to research, evaluation and the development of the science and research base...”

W&N acknowledge some divergence of interests between the partners (scholars and police) in terms of their areas of interest. They observe that police need to act quickly and care about issues such as finance and efficiency as well as effectiveness. Academia, by contrast, is often slow to reach any conclusions, often too late to be operationally relevant and, in studying crime prevention, focuses on programs of not much interest to police (such as early childhood interventions and their effects on delinquency or criminal propensity later in life).<sup>13</sup> W&N also suggest that part of the underlying problem might be that police do not study scientific methods and scientists do not know much about operational policing, so the relationship has a rocky start, lacking common ground or shared experience.

W&N’s proposed remedy involves repositioning the relationship, changing the sources of impetus and support, and thus shifting the balance of ownership between the partners. They focus less on the underlying defects in the relationship and why it is not working. They certainly admit that it is not working; indeed, that is what motivates their paper. They express concern that investments made during the 1990s have since dwindled, police science having failed to establish itself or produce many results of value or relevance to police agencies.

This paper focuses on the underlying assumptions of W&N’s paper rather than on its particular suggestions. Many social

scientists would not relish their suggestion — that police take charge of the research agenda — fearing a drop-off in the quality of scholarship. In that respect, W&N’s conclusions are unusual. However, their underlying assumptions — that policing should be *evidence-based*, and that you can’t know what works unless you take scientific research seriously — align closely with the foundations of the evidence-based policing movement.<sup>14</sup> This paper examines the underlying assumptions of that broader EBP movement, as what EBP proposes requires some counterbalance and caution, particularly at this time in the development of policing.

Evidence-based policing rests on an underlying assumption that the only way for police to know what works is for them to allow social scientists — the professional evaluators — to make determinations for them, and that social scientists, being trained in statistical and empirical methods (whereas police generally are not) can offer their “high science” of controlled experiments and sophisticated program evaluation methods. Police ought then to be keenly interested in and grateful for the truths that social science methods make available. Furthermore, the champions of EBP propose that police should subsequently limit themselves to using only those programs that the scholarly community has been able to establish as effective. In other words, *science should govern policing*. Thus, the central message in the EBP movement aligns quite well with the first of the three possible interpretations of *governing science*.

Lawrence Sherman, describing the underlying theory of EBP in 1998, proposes:

One way to describe people who try to apply research is the role of “evidence cop.” More like a traffic cop than Victor Hugo’s detective Javert, the evidence cop’s job is to redirect practice through compliance rather than punishment. While this job may be as challenging as herding cats, it still consists of pointing professionals to practice “this way, not that way.”<sup>15</sup>

Police practitioners might bristle at the notion of being herded (like cats) by social scientists. However, Sherman pushes further, proposing that police be evaluated on the basis of whether they conform to what the researchers have recommended:

Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers. Put more simply, evidence-based policing uses research to guide practice and evaluate practitioners. ...

Evidence-based policing is about two very different kinds of research: basic research on what works best ... and ongoing outcomes research about the results each unit is actually achieving by applying (or ignoring) basic research in practice.<sup>16</sup>

This kind of language infuriates police practitioners. Should police managers — who carry all of the responsibility for day-to-day policing and suffer directly the consequences of failure — be chastised by social scientists (who carry none of the responsibility) simply because they chose to ignore a published research finding, or executed an untested or unproven strategy? The idea that science should guide and govern policing in such a way — so that scientists discipline practitioners who don’t comply with scientific guidelines — seems ridiculous to practitioners and completely inappropriate to many academics as

well. But exactly *why* the relationship should *not* be structured this way is a serious enough question, which this paper seeks to answer.

Many of us are more attracted to the third interpretation of *governing science* that, by exploring the police role in the context of democratic governance, emphasizes multiple dimensions of performance and value, and embraces a range of operational styles that move considerably beyond the replication of a small number of “proven” or approved programs. This third interpretation of *governing science* also seems most neutral on the question of which partner (police or science) is supposed to govern the other. It suggests a more healthy collaboration in the long term, with each party delivering their appropriate and respective contributions in support of democratic policing.

Given the more aggressive claims of some of EBP’s champions, there is also some serious work to be done along the lines of the second interpretation. Police themselves need to do some *governing*. The police profession needs:

- A more comprehensive view of the range of scientific methods relevant to policing.
- A proper understanding of where different types of science belong.
- Confidence to specify the investments in science that they most need.
- A clear sense of what might be at risk when scholars claim too much or stray beyond their proper role.

### Periodic Reminders for Social Scientists

Social scientific research methods have their place, of course, in adding to knowledge. The evidence-based policy movement in general emphasizes program evaluation techniques and concentrates on determining causation. Many of the relevant research techniques require analytical sophistication. Valid experiments take considerable care and skill to design, conduct and evaluate. The tools of EBP are expensive, but anyone who values knowledge should surely value methods that can help to produce it. Reliable findings about what works, and what doesn’t, can help avoid the perpetuation of useless practices and can prevent police officials or politicians from making bogus claims about their achievements or perpetuating useless programs for personal or political reasons. Police managers should surely take note of experimental results and research findings that impinge on operational decisions they need to make. Not to do so would be professionally irresponsible.

From time to time, though, it seems that social scientists need to be reminded of a few things:

- They have no monopoly on useful knowledge or on useful methods for acquiring it.
- Experience and skills count too; there are myriad ways of discovering useful truths without the elaborate machinery of social science evaluations.
- The majority of scientific advances benefitting humankind have arisen and become firmly established without their help.
- “Lay inquiry,” with its messier methods and iterative ad hoc experimentation, contributes mightily to the development of knowledge.
- Program evaluation comes very late in a long process of research, problem identification, diagnosis and policy development. All of the earlier stages — spotting problems

in the first place, scoping them, figuring out their structure and dynamics, and designing a set of plausibly effective interventions — all require analytic support, too, but not normally of the specific types offered by the conventions of social science research.

In 1990, Charles Lindblom, a professor of political science at Yale University, published *Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society*. Lindblom set out to examine “how people in contemporary industrialized societies, competently or not, go about gathering and analyzing information in grappling with social problems.”<sup>17</sup> Lindblom’s “people” (who go about this task) include politicians, citizens, natural scientists, social scientists, practitioners, and ordinary but curious folk — whom he labels “lay inquirers.” By no means did Lindblom set out to attack the social sciences, but in the process of evaluating relative contributions from different types of inquiry and groups of inquirers, he does end up giving social scientists a very hard time. They make the mistake, he says, of overvaluing their own highly technical approaches to the acquisition of knowledge and of presuming that opinions reached any other way must stem from unfounded beliefs or foolishness:

To be sure, many social scientists and other commentators on social problem solving have fallen into believing that decision makers can approach problems in only one of two ways: either technically, as means to ends, or with all the rigidities, obfuscations, and imprecisions of ideology. But a third option is available: selective and varied probing of both ends and means, as well as of other values.<sup>18</sup>

Mark Moore (2006) also comments on the challenge that a continuum of knowledge poses, and the perils of ignoring everything between the extremes:

[B]oth the research and the practice field in policing face the important question of how far down the path of scientific sophistication they should go in their combined efforts to establish a firm experiential and empirical basis for policing. More provocatively put, they have to decide what to do with the knowledge that lies between mere opinion on one hand, and results established through randomized trials on the other.

A 1995 paper by Moore, titled “Learning While Doing,” examines the linkages between knowledge and policy formulation, specifically in the context of community policing and violence prevention in the United States.<sup>20</sup> Moore recognizes, of course, the value of social science research methods and acknowledges their place in policy development, but, like Lindblom, he warns against giving them too central a role in policy development:

Let me hasten to say that I don’t think that social scientists are wrong to want knowledge to guide policy. Indeed, it would be irresponsible *not* to use thought, evidence and experience to guide policy makers when they commit substantial public resources to a particular goal. Instead, I think their mistake lies in having too narrow a view of what constitutes knowledge valuable enough to use in confronting public problems, too rigid an idea about where and how useful knowledge accumulates in the society, and too unrealistic a view of how knowledge might best be diffused and de-

ployed in aid of both immediate action and continued learning.<sup>21</sup>

### Not Just Another Periodic Reminder

My purpose here is not just to issue yet another periodic reminder. Others have done that job quite thoroughly elsewhere and continue to do it in a variety of fields, whenever social scientists exaggerate their own contributions or attempt to exert control over practitioners (i.e., to *govern* policymaking). The contention of this paper is stronger, more particular, and timely, I hope. I believe that we are in a particularly important period in the development of police science, requiring enriched and productive relationships between police and academia. I also believe that much harm might result if we give EBP a dominant position in the context of that relationship.

### Why Police Should Govern the Role of Science

Here are three reasons why the police profession should work particularly hard to govern science at this time.

1. **The methods championed by proponents of EBP are fundamentally incompatible with the operational realities of problem-oriented policing.** Although many departments have made some progress in learning some particular forms of the problem-solving method, relatively few have developed the kind of versatility that Herman Goldstein originally envisaged. Fewer still have developed the range of analytic techniques, organizational fluidity, and related managerial skills that would enable them to work effectively on problems of all shapes and sizes. The maturing of the problem-solving approach remains a priority for the profession, particularly as the range of threats confronted by police expands beyond those that are neighborhood or place-based. EBP represents a potential threat to, and a diversion from, the styles of scientific inquiry needed to advance the art of problem-oriented policing. Social scientists championing the cause of EBP, if given their head at this particular point in time, could unwittingly obstruct the maturation of the problem-solving strategy.
2. **The social scientific research methods embraced by EBP represent a tiny fraction of the scientific methods relevant to policing.** They should therefore represent a small portion of the relevant investment portfolio, and should garner a relatively small fraction of the attention given to science. Giving too much attention to EBP at this time necessarily means giving too little attention to a much broader range of scientific inquiry methods that deserve higher priority. Equating EBP with science is grossly misleading.
3. **The form of the relationship between police and academia envisaged by EBP is unstable and unsustainable.** There is too much in it for the social scientists, and almost nothing in it for the police. That is precisely why the champions of EBP press so hard, and why police continue to show so little interest and remain largely unaffected. It is not so much that the relationship needs to be *relocated* (as W&N suggest); it needs to be *redefined*. The prescription is wrong. If EBP is given a central place in the relationship, the relationship may in fact be damaged, and many other opportunities for productive collaboration may be lost as a result.

The following sections examine each of these three arguments in more detail.

### Why Evidence-Based Policing Is Fundamentally Incompatible With Problem-Oriented Policing

EBP is incompatible with POP for the following seven reasons:

1. **EBP is too slow in making determinations to support operational problem-solving.** The problems that spawned the interventions have themselves long since passed, or morphed into another form, by the time the interventions can pass through the elaborate experimental and evaluative procedures espoused by EBP. EBP may eventually produce dependable results with high levels of confidence, but these typically arrive between 3 and 5 years after the development of an intervention. This makes EBP findings relevant to operations only when it evaluates programs that are permanent or long-standing and change very little over time or across jurisdictions. Such programs are not the focus of problem-oriented policing, which seeks ad hoc and sufficient solutions for the problems of the day and then moves on quickly to the problems of tomorrow, expecting that those will be different.
2. **EBP produces no new solutions and may even narrow the range of solutions available.** Proponents of EBP suggest or imply that police should only use those methods that EBP scholars have already been able to validate. Problem-oriented policing, by contrast, encourages creativity and rapid experimentation, thus dramatically *expanding* the range of techniques and methods available. Ceding too much influence to EBP may therefore produce a bias against action and too narrow a search for solutions.<sup>22</sup>
3. **Social scientists focus on subtle effects at high (aggregate) levels; problem-solving focuses on much more obvious effects but at lower levels.** Social scientists (and economists) have tended to conduct macro-level analyses on aggregate data sets. They like to use sophisticated statistical methods on large data sets to reveal subtle correlations and causalities between factors and outcomes. Inheriting these tendencies, EBP emphasizes the importance of evaluating the effect that particular programs (e.g., DARE, early childhood intervention programs, or random patrols) might or might not have on overall crime rates or on some major category of crime rates (e.g., violence), delinquency rates, or addiction rates later in life.

Problem-solving, as taught by Goldstein, emphasizes careful *disaggregation* of broad crime categories, following the intuition that major crime problems have many parts (lower-level components) and that, usually, the various parts each behave differently and depend on different factors. Once the lower-level objects have been found (often through analysis), then each one can be studied and “unpicked.” In *The Character of Harms*, I have described how the art of navigating these lower level strata of *problems* or *harms* is emerging as a vital professional skill for regulators and law enforcement:

The habits of mind ... have something in common with the skills involved in a relatively mundane task: the undoing of knots. Give a knotted mass of string to an adult, who has developed all of the relevant cognitive skills (and maybe had some experience too), and

watch how they behave. Notice how they hold the whole object up to the light, and look at it this way, then that way, turning it around and around, examining it diligently from all sides — careful all the time not to pull or tug or to make matters worse — until they begin to understand the *structure of the thing itself*. As the structure of the knot becomes clearer, so the components or stages of a plan begin to form in their minds. ... If they understood the structure correctly, and fashioned a plan accordingly, the knot eventually falls apart, and is no more.

In the regulatory field, we have a growing list of harms undone, knots untied, risk-concentrations eliminated or substantially mitigated. Invariably, the knots undone by regulators, or others who act in this vein, are not broad, general phenomena (at the level of “air pollution,” or “corruption,” or “motor vehicle accidents”). Nor are they minutiae, representing single incidents (of crime, or injury, or death). These knots untied, these harms undone, all lie in between, where the object of study is larger than a single incident or event, but smaller than a general class of harms. It is in this in-between realm where much exciting work seems to take place, amid the complex and multi-layered texture that connects individual incidents at the bottom to entire classes of risk (with their one or two word descriptions) at the top.<sup>23</sup>

The impetus for problem-oriented policing arises in part from the realization that it makes little sense to focus on general programmatic treatments for general crime categories if the texture beneath is in fact highly complex, variegated, and populated by many unlike objects. Problem-oriented policing is born from a conviction that working in the textured layers beneath (rather than at the level of generalities or major crime categories) offers greater promise and quicker results.

**4. Ironically, greater influence for EBP may reduce the rate of experimentation in policing.** Professional researchers, as masters of experimental design and evaluation, regard themselves as the authority on what constitutes a “proper” experiment. Thus, police agencies where the *evidence cops* hold sway might be less inclined to proceed with any experimentation that falls short of scholarly standards. In particular, such agencies might be less inclined to proceed with the type of iterative, developmental and exploratory experimentation that characterizes problem-solving.

EBP proponents want valid controls as well as crystal-clear specification of the intervention being tested. Their design purpose is to establish causal connections. However, problem-solvers’ purposes and methods are different. They seek to quickly generate creative, plausibly effective solutions, which are worth trying just because there is a chance they might fix the problem.<sup>24</sup> Problem-solvers certainly want to see problems reduced or eliminated and should be methodologically rigorous when it comes to monitoring the abatement of the specific problems addressed so they can tell when progress is being made (hence, Goldstein’s strong emphasis on measurement and monitoring).<sup>25</sup> However, they are not so concerned about proving causality. Consequently, problem-solving does not normally impose the additional methodological constraints that would support

determinations of causality. Problem-solvers use iterative techniques, short-cycle development and rapid, early assessments of impact, followed by ad hoc and multiple adjustments — all of which confound the technical methods of social science evaluation. As John Eck has pointed out, “Rigorous evaluations are an awkward, inefficient, and unnatural way to learn about what works when we are interested in small-scale, small-claim, discrete interventions.”<sup>26</sup> Hence the danger: If EBP is allowed to set the standards for police experimentation, then much valuable experimentation might be curtailed.

**5. EBP may reinforce and perpetuate the program-centric mindset in policing, which problem-oriented policing was supposed to dispel.** The entire motivation for problem-solving — not just in policing but also across the whole field of social regulation — is to help public agencies understand the deficiencies of a functional or programmatic view of their work, and discover what it means to be task-based rather than tool-based.<sup>27</sup> Skilled craftsmen do not spend the day staring at the array of tools hanging from the workshop wall, contemplating which ones work and which ones don’t; rather, the craftsman stands at the task bench and focuses on what must be accomplished. Problem-solving represents a fundamental departure from a tool-centric or program-centric approach, because it recreates the experience of the craftsman in his shop, standing at the task bench, studying the task, facing the dawning and uncomfortable realization that “I don’t have a tool for this”; at which point the successful craftsman invents and fabricates a new tool tailor-made for the job.

Proponents of EBP argue that they, too, realize that programs should not be mindlessly copied from one jurisdiction to another. They acknowledge the need to anticipate adjustments and refinements based on local conditions when replicating successful programs. However, this is a tiny move and not enough to restore the appropriate frame of mind for problem-solving. Make some minor adjustments to a hammer and it is still fundamentally a hammer. Adjust your saw blade, and it still only makes cuts. A tool-focus is what we were trying to escape. An adjustable wrench is still a wrench, and no amount of fiddling with it will help if the task is to retrieve a loose screw lodged deep in an engine crankcase, and the craftsman has no suitable tool for that. Making tools adjustable might make them more broadly useful. Nevertheless, focusing first on programs is still a fundamentally different frame of mind than focusing first on problems; these two mindsets lead to entirely different organizational behaviors and responses.

**6. With its reliance on statistical techniques, EBP may not recognize or reward the best problem-solving performance.** In any risk-control or harm-reduction setting real success means “spotting emerging problems early and suppressing them before they do much damage.”<sup>28</sup> Sophisticated analysis and pattern recognition capabilities, along with bristling intelligence antennae and other forms of alertness and vigilance, can help an agency spot emerging problems earlier rather than later. The earlier the *spotting*, the less noticeable (in a statistical sense) will be the *suppressing*. The problem itself and the effects of any intervention will each be less discernible through quantitative analysis if the action was early and swift. By contrast, problems that have

been allowed to grow hopelessly out of control, and which are then dramatically reduced through some sizeable effort, are much more likely to show up as demonstrable successes through the evaluative lenses of EBP. EBP's methods will mostly recognize only bigger, later suppressions and may not be able to discern or appreciate the deftness and nimbleness that constitutes real problem-solving success. Allowing EBP to arbitrate *what works* could have the perverse effect of leading the profession to celebrate only those crime-reduction successes that had been preceded by substantial failures.

**7. EBP focuses only on specific interventions and pays little attention to the development of an agency's problem-solving capacity and skills.** Problem-oriented policing has profound implications for almost every aspect of a police department's operations:

- It requires new sets of skills for officers engaging in it.
- It requires extensive analytic support at several different stages of the problem-solving process.
- It makes senior officers responsible for tackling a portfolio of problems or risks rather than managing a portfolio of programs or functions.
- It severely stretches the internal fabric of an agency because the majority of problems simply don't fit neatly within existing organizational units.
- It plunges the agency into a constellation of complicated inter-agency and cross-sectoral partnerships, simply because real-world problems don't respect agency boundaries either.

EBP focuses closely on the evaluation of specific interventions and very little, if at all, on the development of agency competencies. Even interventions that failed — in the narrow sense of having produced no measurable impact on levels of crime or disorder — may nevertheless have contributed to agency experience, developed the capacity and confidence of its officers, enriched important partnerships with other parts of government, and strengthened community engagement through collaborative efforts. For problem-oriented policing to mature, the profession must pay significant attention to all of these other forms of progress, which EBP tends to overlook.

### Evidence-Based Policing Fights Back

Several of these arguments have been made before, and some of the more enlightened advocates for EBP seem prepared to acknowledge many or all of them. But the EBP movement seems unwilling to let problem-oriented policing alone or to recognize it as an area where EBP's preferred methods might have severely limited value. Curiously, as if problem-solving represents some kind of threat to the status of social science, EBP seeks to reassert control, and its supporters appear to have pursued two particular strategies for this purpose.

#### Evaluating Problem-Oriented Policing as a General Strategy

The first involves moving to a higher level. EBP may concede that social science research methods cannot keep pace with operational policing, and might be too expensive and elaborate to apply to low-level and short-term problem-solving efforts, but they can surely *evaluate the overall strategy of problem-solving!* This

represents an attractive proposition for the scholars, if only it were possible. They might be able to establish that problem-solving actually works to reduce crime and disorder, in which case EBP could share the credit for anything that problem-solving subsequently accomplished. Alternatively, perhaps scientific research might demonstrate conclusively that problem-oriented policing doesn't work at all, in which case all of the threats to the scientists' *right to govern* policing, laid out earlier, would simply fizzle away.

As a theoretical matter, evaluating an overall strategy (such as *problem-oriented policing*) is quite different from evaluating a set of particular interventions that the strategy has produced.<sup>29</sup> As a practical matter, there is no way that the efficacy of problem-oriented policing, as an overall strategy, could be determined through formally structured experiments or evaluations. There are simply too many different forms of it, many of them deemed "shallow" one way or another by the scholars,<sup>30</sup> and too little maturity in terms of the broader versatility originally envisaged. The prospect of finding even 50 departments who operate the same version of problem-solving, and another 50 who clearly do not (for the sake of providing a suitable control group), seems extremely remote.

A recent study led by David Weisburd illustrates the difficulties involved in trying to evaluate problem-oriented policing as an overall strategy. It also provides a wonderful illustration of the consequences of focusing first on quality of evidence rather than on a broader search for operational insights. Four researchers set out to conduct a "Campbell Systematic Review" of existing literature in order to determine "whether POP is effective in reducing crime and disorder."<sup>31</sup> Following protocols established by the Campbell Collaboration,<sup>32</sup> these researchers first conducted a massive troll of the research literature, uncovering no less than 5,500 relevant articles and reports. They applied the standard methodological threshold tests and concluded that only 10 of these studies (those that involved randomized or well-matched comparison groups) made the cut.

Weisburd and his fellow researchers then combined the findings from these 10 studies, using meta-analysis techniques, and arrived at the conclusion that POP seemed to have some modest, but nevertheless perceptible effect.<sup>33</sup> However, the researchers noted that, if they had chosen to use a different method of combining the results from these 10 studies (a method called *vote-counting*<sup>34</sup>), then the conclusion would have been entirely different (i.e., "no discernible effect").<sup>35</sup> After all that effort, their eventual determination of whether POP has any effect at all hinges on the researchers' choice among available methods for combining the results.

There was potentially more encouraging news from the second part of this study. The authors noted that, by relaxing their methodological standards somewhat (admitting studies that had pre/post data but lacked control or comparison groups), they could bring in a further 45 studies from the remaining pool. The combined results from this broader collection were "overwhelmingly in favor of POP effectiveness."<sup>36</sup> However, the authors then noted that combining the effects from a broad collection of problem-solving interventions, each aimed at quite different types of problems, seemed problematic. Indeed, it does. After all, the idea was to test the *overall strategy* of problem-oriented policing, not to try to combine a set of miscellaneous but particular *interventions* that problem-oriented approaches had produced. Using statistical aggregation techniques to combine outcomes

from interventions focused on quite different types of problems seems vaguely bizarre. It is like posing some general and high-level question such as “Do drugs work?” and then trying to answer that question by combining studies involving quite different drugs, applied to patients with quite different conditions. Normally meta-analysis techniques are used to combine results from several implementations of the *same program*. Cognizant of this difficulty, Weisburd and colleagues add an appropriately cautious rider to these (initially more encouraging) results: “this diversity of programs and approaches also should bring caution to any conclusions drawn from our study.”<sup>37</sup>

The net result? A mammoth undertaking, involving the review of 5,500 articles and reports, rejection of all but a handful of them because the evidence they contained was deemed not of sufficient quality, and sophisticated meta-analysis of the few that did clear the threshold, yielding highly tenuous conclusions that readers are advised to treat with “caution.” For professional social scientists, this is a veritable *tour de force* demonstrating the highest levels of technical and methodological sophistication. And for operational policing? Probably nothing much useful: no new insights or ideas, and no reliable conclusions. No wonder that scholars across many policy domains are now asking, “What is it about experimental evaluation, or ... quasi-experimental evaluation, which leads even the very best of it to yield so little?”<sup>38</sup>

Of course, had this review uncovered hundreds or thousands of properly conducted experiments, rather than only 10, then the results might have been more conclusive. Weisburd and his colleagues are quick to observe the general absence of such studies, concluding that “the evidence base in this area is deficient given the strong investment in POP.”<sup>39</sup> How should we remedy that deficiency? Weisburd and colleagues offer the standard EBP proposal that “a much larger number of studies is needed to draw strong generalizations regarding the possible effectiveness of POP.”<sup>40</sup>

Of course, there might be some other ways to remedy the situation. One might pay more attention to other forms of evidence or ponder, at least for a moment, the insights and wisdom contained in the other 5,445 reports.

Gilles Paquet, former President of the Royal Society of Canada, describes a variety of “blockages” to the production of knowledge suitable for informing public policy and aims squarely at the evidence-based policy movement generally:

The second family of blockages pertains to the notion of evidence. It stems from a tendency of the fundamentalists to summarily reject a whole range of types of knowledge as irrelevant, if not meaningless, if that knowledge does not originate from the credentialized tribe and is not the result of work done according to certain prescribed protocols.<sup>41</sup>

Proponents of EBP have set the bar for *knowing* so high, and made the means for generating knowledge so particular, that they end up knowing relatively little. Operational police need to know much more, just well enough and much sooner, in order to keep up with the pace and variety of the challenges they face.

### Focusing on Place-Based Problem-Solving Interventions

EBP will probably never manage to produce a convincing evaluation of problem-oriented policing at the level of a depart-

mental strategy. Perhaps recognizing this, the EBP movement makes a second attempt to re-insert itself firmly into the problem-solving arena. If the research scientists can't keep pace with individual problem-solving projects, and they have little hope of evaluating the overall strategy, then maybe they can find some particular *version* of problem-solving that can act as a proxy for the overall strategy and which they *can* actually evaluate. EBP does seem to have found one: the use of *place-based interventions*. Much of the current energy in the EBP movement seems to be gravitating to this area — testing the effects of order maintenance and other localized interventions — and confirming for us what must have seemed intuitively obvious to police executives for decades: Place-based problems tend to have place-based solutions.

It seems somewhat curious that EBP, in trying to offer some insight on the efficacy of problem-oriented policing, would end up focusing on such an old and familiar police tradition, one that actually predates Goldstein. Perhaps EBP focuses on place-based interventions because place-based experiments are relatively easy to design and conduct. The data required to identify spatial (or temporal) concentrations already exists. The analysis required to identify geographic clusters is straightforward and familiar. Furthermore, *places*, when divided into treatment and control groups, don't complain, call their lawyers, or lodge constitutional objections about unequal treatment.<sup>42</sup>

Organizing experiments around *other* dimensions may be more difficult. Substantial ethical difficulties arise and potential legal challenges may result whenever randomized controlled experiments are organized around pervasively criminal families, classes of victims, or different cohorts of schoolchildren drawn into gang-related activity — where substantial groups of *people* end up getting quite different treatments.

“But, in medicine, they do that all the time,” some may object. “They conduct experiments on issues of life and death, with human control groups, all day and every day.” True. However, medical experimentation is based on *informed consent* and *voluntary participation* — features of the experimental environment that policing seldom enjoys.

One of the broader and more sophisticated inquiries into the efficacy of problem-solving was conducted recently by Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond, working with the Lowell, Mass., Police Department.<sup>43</sup> Through analysis, they identified 34 crime hot spots in Lowell and allocated 17 of them to a treatment group and 17 to a control group, using a matching procedure. Three types of problem-solving interventions were applied within the treatment group: (1) sustained programs of misdemeanor arrests, (2) other “situational” (i.e., place-based) strategies, and (3) some “social service” strategies (referrals and other services offered to specific individuals). Braga and Bond's analysis of the experiment, which employed *mediation analysis* and other highly sophisticated statistical methods, enabled them to draw two main conclusions: (a) a collection of interventions, “focused at specific high-activity crime and disorder places in the city,” can generate crime prevention gains;<sup>44</sup> and (b) “the strongest crime prevention benefits were driven by situational strategies that attempted to modify the criminal opportunity structure at crime and disorder hot-spot locations,” with misdemeanor arrest strategies and social-service-type interventions scoring less well.<sup>45</sup>

Should we therefore conclude that situational crime prevention techniques are hereby validated and that the alternate (people-based) strategies should continue to be regarded with con-

tinuing skepticism? I think not. I have complete confidence in these two authors' analytic skills, experimental disciplines, and the diligent cooperation of the Lowell Police Department under their Chief at the time, Ed Davis. However, I have a strong suspicion that the conclusions the researchers could draw as a result of this experiment are not surprising and are largely determined by the way the experiment was designed. The crime concentrations selected as the foundation for the experiment were *spatial*. Experience with problem-solving in a broad range of other domains teaches us that the dimensions in which a problem or risk is concentrated are often (but not always) closely related to the dimensionality of the solutions.<sup>46</sup> Place-based problems are more likely to have place-based remedies. Family-centered problems are more likely to respond to family-centric interventions. Social-needs-based problems are more likely to benefit from the provision of social services. Thus, it is not fair to compare three classes of intervention, each organized around different dimensions, starting with only place-based crime concentrations. One might expect, or might even predict, that place-based strategies would come out on top.

It may be that criminologists conduct place-based experiments simply *because they can*. (In Weisburd and colleagues' Campbell Systematic Review, they found only four randomized studies among the 5,500 POP-related articles, and *all four* involved place-based experiments.<sup>47</sup>) Researchers may therefore be quicker to confirm the efficacy of place-based strategies than other types of problem-based interventions. The danger, of course, is that the audience for these evaluations might imagine this actually teaches us about what works and what doesn't in policing. What EBP can actually "prove" has as much to do with the limitations and feasibility of their own research methods as it has to do with what actually works. Perhaps this is why the list of approved interventions remains so short. The shortness of the list might have much less to do with the effectiveness of policing strategies, and much more to do with the limitations of EBP's approved methodologies, and the difficulties of applying them in the policing environment.

### A Broader Range of Scientific Methods

The social sciences have an older brother, the natural sciences, with a better established and more robust record of accomplishment. Natural scientists not only look into different areas (physics, biology, chemistry, astronomy, engineering) but also tend to inquire in different ways.

Social science experimental techniques tend to treat complex systems (e.g., communities, families, school populations, and even crime organizations) as black boxes. Researchers can control the inputs, testing them in various combinations; and they can monitor what comes out at the other end of the box some time later (e.g., delinquency rates, crime rates, addiction rates, or propensity for violence). They can then apply sophisticated statistical techniques to their accumulated data about inputs and outcomes, and draw causal inferences in some cases.

Natural scientists tend to have different instincts. They lift up the lid of the box and peer inside. They poke and prod around, not knowing at the outset what they expect to find, open to all sorts of possibilities, not yet knowing what tools they will need to probe further. Their inquiry methods are *reflexive*, which means that, as Gilles Paquet explains, "knowledge acquired gets integrated during the process; it influences the design and there-

by modifies the outcome."<sup>48</sup> They do not emphasize any particular or preferred toolkit, nor do they have ingrained in their consciousness any formally approved hierarchy of evidence. They *explore*. They inspect mechanisms up close, rather than observing inputs and outcomes in the aggregate and from a distance. As Pawson and Tilley observed, very few experiments in natural science use experimental/control-group logic.<sup>49</sup>

### Different Scientific Traditions

I remember a recent day-long meeting at Harvard University's School of Law that drew faculty from several of Harvard's schools and from many disciplines. The subject was addiction and addictive behavior, particularly among juveniles, and the effects that various early childhood programs might have on addictive behavior exhibited later in life.<sup>50</sup> For the first hour or so of the meeting, the social science researchers held sway, describing this study and that one, and what they could and couldn't tell from the collection of available studies (which were contradictory in some areas, and generally inconclusive in the aggregate). The moderator invited Jack Shonkoff (Professor of Child Health and Development, and Director of the Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University), who had been quiet until that point, to comment. His first words were:

I wouldn't start with program evaluation. Nor would I start by talking about early preventive programs. I'd start with the science, and what we know about early brain development.

Professor Shonkoff and a colleague, Charles Nelson (Professor of Pediatrics), proceeded to explain to the group what they knew about the plasticity of the brain and the effects of toxic levels of stress during early childhood. Through intensive use of brain scans, the pediatric neuroscience community had been able to watch over time the different effects of too much stress, too little stress, and healthy levels of stress during the early years of childhood, when the patterns of synapses within the brain are still being formed. Natural scientists and medical experts know the value of program evaluation, but they draw on a much broader repertoire of inquiry techniques.

Ernest Nagel, in *The Structure of Science*, points out just how much has been learned by the human race through lay inquiry, careful observation, creativity, exploration, experimentation, trial and error, and incremental adjustment.

Long before the beginnings of modern civilization, men acquired vast funds of information about their environment. They discovered the uses of fire and developed skills for transforming raw materials into shelters, clothing, and utensils. They invented arts of tilling the soil, communicating, and governing themselves. Some of them discovered that objects are moved more easily when placed on carts with wheels, that the sizes of fields are more reliably compared when standard schemes of measurement are employed, and that the seasons of the year as well as many phenomena of the heavens succeed each other with a certain regularity.<sup>51</sup>

Charles Lindblom pushes a little harder and questions whether we actually need social science at all. The accomplishments of the *natural* sciences and engineering, he proposes as a stark contrast, are many and obvious:

Yet the troubling possibility persists that with no or only a few exceptions, societies could perhaps continue to go about these and other activities if social scientists vanished, along with their historical documents, findings, hypotheses, and all human memory of them. . . . The disappearance would presumably in some ways render social tasks more difficult, but perhaps in no case render any existing social task impossible, as would the disappearance of any one of many contributions from natural science and engineering. The value of social science to social problem-solving remains clouded to a degree that would shake any social scientist's complacency.<sup>52</sup>

My purpose in quoting these rather pointed arguments is not to dismiss the relevance of social science research methods to policing but, rather, to press the point that social scientific experiments and evaluation constitute a relatively small and very particular subset of the relevant inquiry toolkit.

We should at least consider which *natural science* inquiry methods might turn out to be relevant or important for policing. A great many of them, I would suggest. Most of what we know about social problems and most of the knowledge already accumulated by police stems from the mindset and methods of natural science inquiry — observation, inspection, investigation and diagnosis, leading to the development of ideas about the scope, nature, and dynamics of various dysfunctions and breakdowns in the social order. Even in policing, natural science inquiry methods have a better established and more robust record of accomplishment than social science's experimental methods.

Some sociologists and criminologists might complain that this is unfair and might protest that they themselves use many of the methods of natural science inquiry, even when examining social issues. Indeed, some of them do. Many social scientists engage in field research, case studies, observation and reporting, synthesis, evaluation, hypothesis development and testing. Many of them have an attitude of professional curiosity, conduct careful observations, compile descriptions, construct stories and derive meaning, offering insights that others may then accept or reject.

However, an *elite* emerges within the discipline: the *randomistas*, as they are known in the field of development economics.<sup>53</sup> They argue that one cannot possibly know anything for sure without a randomized, controlled experiment. They set the standards for professional inquiry so high, and focused on such particular methods, that they then become the ones uniquely qualified to make determinations. They explain carefully to their peers, and to the rest of the world, why more casual or unstructured methods provide no substitute, and how most people therefore really don't know anything for sure.

In this sense, regrettably, EBP is in danger of developing as an *elite* science. Many of its proponents are thinly disguised *randomistas*, and some have no disguise at all. They focus on the most demanding levels of proof, view lay inquiry as poorly structured and therefore invalid, and claim the monopoly right to govern operational decisions in policing. Whatever progress had been made — when social scientists learned to embrace a broader range of natural science methods — is swiftly undone when the *randomistas* produce their hierarchy of evidence and draw threshold lines across it. They leave virtually all of the natural science inquiry methods below the line, effectively demot-

ing them to the *unacceptable* category, for which there is no place within their "elite (social) science."

### EBP's Scientific Methods Scale

The EBP movement has developed a five-level hierarchy, which they call a *scientific methods scale*.<sup>54</sup> Randomized controlled experiments belong at the highest level (tier 5), whereas mere correlations belong at the lowest level (tier 1). The threshold for acceptability is drawn at tier 3, where experimental designs include "moderate statistical controls" such as comparisons between control and treatment groups and between pre- and post-treatment:

Programs coded as working must have at least two "level-3" to "level-5" evaluations showing statistically significant and desirable results and the preponderance of all available evidence showing effectiveness.<sup>55</sup>

Hence, police programs will only be deemed *proven* if multiple independent studies have confirmed their effects. To be valid, the contributing "experiments and quasi-experiments should include large samples, long follow-up periods, follow-up interviews, and provision for an economic analysis."<sup>56</sup> EBP has also declared some willingness to consider findings from *meta-studies*, which compile volumes of data from multiple sources as an alternative to designing new experiments from scratch. To be acceptable, such studies must be extensive and suitably sophisticated. Such stringent specifications will surely have the effect of keeping "acceptable methods" beyond the capabilities of ordinary mortals and thereby guaranteeing a stream of social science research funding for decades to come. EBP has set its thresholds, and the vast majority of ordinary "lay inquiry" and natural science methods fall short of it.

Above EBP's threshold line (in terms of acceptable methods for establishing program effectiveness) lie controlled experiments (preferably randomized), meta-studies, and a miscellaneous collection of other sophisticated program evaluation techniques. Social scientists have one other favorite tool — regression analysis — used not so much to determine causality (as it mostly establishes correlations rather than causal linkages) but used at an earlier stage of inquiry to identify *factors* that might exert significant influence on specific *outcomes*. Identifying such factors, of course, could lead eventually to clues about potential interventions and policy effects. However, there would normally be a lot of ad hoc probing, prodding, and messy experimentation before a regression finding (establishing the significance of one factor or set of factors) could be translated into an intervention design. Nevertheless — and perhaps because of the sophistication and apparent ubiquitous applicability of the tool — regression analysis also seems to have earned a place in the social science elite's preferred toolkit.

### Other Ways of Knowing

Perhaps it is worth bearing in mind that Sir Isaac Newton established the laws of motion and elasticity without using any of these preferred methods. Using his trademark combination of scientific curiosity and creativity, he first estimated the speed of sound in air by clapping his hands at one end of a walkway in Neville's Court (Trinity College, Cambridge) and measuring the interval between the clap and the echo returning from a wall at



the far end of the courtyard. Having no stopwatch, he synchronized the swing of an adjustable-length pendulum to match the delay and later computed the period of the pendulum. He surely conducted experiments. He did so to test the theories that he developed to explain the observations that he so carefully made. Observation begat theories, and theories begat further observation. His experiments were not randomized, nor controlled, and involved no meta-analyses nor regressions.

Perhaps it is also worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of modern medical knowledge has accumulated without the use of this elite toolkit. Yes, specific remedies are now tested through randomized clinical trials, but medical students first learn anatomy and are required to dissect a cadaver as part of their training so that they can see how the human body is put together. They learn how the musculo-skeletal system works, then the cardio-pulmonary system, the endocrine system, the nervous system, and so on. Next, they learn about the myriad ways in which physiological failures can occur. During their training, they talk to hundreds or thousands of patients with various symptoms and conditions. They do most of this learning by using their own eyes and ears, aided by microscopes, stethoscopes, scanners of one kind or another, patient interviews and examinations, and lab tests galore.

Only at a very late stage, when the medical community wants to check the efficacy of one treatment protocol compared with another, in relation to a specific condition or diagnosis, does it turn to controlled experiments. When it does, medicine has many advantages over policing. Throughout the world, the human body works basically the same way and is subject to common modes of failure or dysfunction. (The same is not true for societies, communities, neighborhoods or crime problems).<sup>57</sup> These medical failure modes are finite in number and have already been codified as a list of diagnoses (not true for policing problems). For any one diagnosis, there are at least thousands of cases, if not millions (not true for policing problems). For clinical trials in medicine, hundreds or thousands of patients can generally be identified who not only share the same underlying diagnosis but also satisfy any additional demographic filters that experimenters may choose to apply.

Modern medicine generates numerous clinical trials, in part, because of the interests of corporations. Manufacturers of drugs and medical devices have powerful incentives to overstate the effectiveness of their products and to press those claims on doctors and patients alike. Regulators (such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration) require manufacturers to supply evidence from clinical trials before granting approval for new products or certifying new uses for them. Stringency in testing seems natural and appropriate in such circumstances, given the commercial incentives in play.<sup>58</sup>

Randomized studies turn out to be easier to run, as a practical matter, for drugs than for other types of medical intervention. The administration of drugs is relatively easy to standardize. As medical researchers have pointed out,

[T]here is a lack of generalisability once we move away from drugs to manual interventions. For example, difficulty in devising practice policies in surgery arises because decisions depend on the features of a particular patient (obesity, anatomy, quality of tissue), the particular surgeon, and various external factors (equipment available, competence of assistants).<sup>59</sup>

What is true for surgery is most certainly true for policing, with little prospect of precisely replicating interventions across jurisdictions. The good news, in medicine, is that for pharmaceuticals — an area where commercial propositions deserve the most careful scrutiny — the treatments happen to be relatively generalizable, which makes clinical trials feasible.

It may be good news for policing that there are relatively few commercial interests at stake in advancing one crime prevention strategy over another. We should certainly beware those cases where specific commercial products are closely associated with specific policing strategies or tactics (as may be the case with the recent emergence of *predictive analytics*, the adoption of technical products such as Tazers and particular types of firearms, body armor or vehicles). Such circumstances demand heightened skepticism, closer scrutiny and stricter evaluative standards. There do not appear to be any particular commercial interests behind problem- or community-oriented policing, so expensive research to safeguard against commercially motivated and overblown claims of effectiveness probably are not needed in these areas. Lower levels of evidentiary support for these strategies might serve the profession perfectly well.

### Natural Science Inquiry Methods in Policing

Does the police profession use the equivalent of natural science inquiry methods? Absolutely. I would suggest that crime analysis, intelligence analysis, intelligence-gathering, investigations, investigative field-craft and general surveillance techniques all fall squarely into this category. These are the ordinary processes of discovery, structured and unstructured, through which police find out what is happening, and why, and begin to explore how best to intervene. Such methods can be more or less sophisticated, of course, and they can be very sophisticated indeed without involving any of the tools from EBP's elite toolkit. Moreover, police and scholars can collaborate closely and productively around such methods.

The Boston Gun Project provides an obvious example of such a collaboration. Three Harvard scholars worked closely with Boston police and other agencies to find the causes of escalating juvenile homicide rates in Boston and figure out what might be done. They were given some hypotheses, developed more of their own, and tested these hypotheses by talking to street workers, gang members, and anyone else who could provide useful insights. They inherited one particular theory — that the violence was fuelled by an uncontrolled supply of guns from southern states. They checked out that theory by tracing guns used in past homicides back to their point of first sale. What they found out (most of the guns used in homicides were sold first in Massachusetts and were relatively new when used) demolished that theory, and the team quickly abandoned it. Next, they searched for new ideas, listening carefully to a broad range of players. Like natural scientists running back and forth between the lab and the field, these researchers moved back and forth constantly between data analysis and street-level inquiry, each form of investigation informing, enriching and redirecting the other. Eventually, "the structure of the knot" came into focus, and its internal dynamics became clear. The researchers and their police partners saw clearly the structure of the 61 gangs, the patterns of established gang "beefs," and the role played by peer pressure within the gangs when it came to violence. Finally, once they understood the structure of the problem, the project

team devised a tailor-made strategy to reverse the effects of peer pressure within the gangs.

What did these researchers *not* do? For this project, they did not conduct any randomized experiments, perform any meta-analyses, nor did they use regression analysis. The entire project was set up and funded (by NIJ) as a problem-solving demonstration project, not as a program evaluation or criminological research project. In fact, there was no formal experimental structure for the project, which may leave the EBP community wondering whether or not Operation Ceasefire really worked, or whether the 63 percent reduction in the youth homicide rate,<sup>60</sup> which quickly followed implementation of the Ceasefire strategy, was merely some kind of fluke.<sup>61</sup> Maybe, several years later, EBP scientists will come up with some method to confirm (subject to their own standards of evidence) that Operation Ceasefire actually saved lives. Even if they do, we should be grateful for all the lives that will have been saved in the meantime.

What a shame it would be if this type of cooperation between police and scholars were not valued, just because this partnership used nothing from the toolbox of elite science. What a shame it would be if the many forms of analysis this team (and others like them) employed along the way, when unraveling a serious crime problem, were deemed unsatisfactory. What a tragedy if operational policing ever had to wait for social science to catch up.

Because some social scientists use natural science methods, and natural scientists occasionally run controlled experiments, drawing a sharp line separating the two sets of research methods is somewhat problematic. However, distinguishing the much smaller set of social science methods approved by the EBP elite from all other scientific methods is actually much easier, simply because the preferred toolbox is so small and its contents quite easily enumerated.

### Data-Analysis and Pattern Recognition in the Natural Sciences

Some may make the mistake of assuming that natural science methods look only locally, through the microscope or by way of lab tests, at one object at a time; and that any methods involving analysis of large data sets (such as crime analysis) must obviously belong to the social sciences. This is plainly wrong. The entire field of *pattern recognition* techniques, for example, aligns better with the instincts of natural scientists than with those of social scientists. Fraud detection algorithms (which operate across massive databases of financial and transactional data) have nothing to do with program evaluation or controlled experimentation, and everything to do with searching for anything strange that might be there and exploring the nature of anything that appears.

Nicholas Christakis (Professor of Medicine and Medical Sociology at Harvard Medical School) explores the mechanisms through which disease or health effects are transmitted through social networks. Through the application of network analysis and other analytic methods, he has shown, for example, how obesity can be transmitted through social ties as individuals influence the attitudes and behaviors of family and friends around them. Christakis reports that the advent of social networking sites such as Facebook have presented researchers in this area enormous repositories of data, electronically available and ripe for analysis. His use of them is highly sophisticated, deeply sci-

entific and analytical in nature. Nevertheless, his instincts align more with the mindset and methods of investigation and exploration rather than program evaluation, hence more with the habits of natural scientists than those of social scientists.<sup>62</sup> In a recent interview with *Harvard Magazine*, Christakis explained the significance of natural curiosity and open-mindedness, coupled with a broad range of analytic instruments, in finding out how things work. He applies the same mindset, he implied, when exploring terabytes of social network data as Galileo employed when he peered through his telescope to fathom the structure of the heavens:

In some ways the availability of these new kinds of data is like what the microscope was to Van Leeuwenhoek or the telescope to Galileo. When the telescope was invented, Galileo just started looking at stuff. He looked at the moon and he saw mountains. He looked at Jupiter and found moons encircling it. He looked at the sun and found sun spots. There's this huge part of science which is just about careful observation and curiosity about the world.<sup>63</sup>

This "huge part of science" routinely dwarfs social science in making contributions to knowledge. It would be strange indeed if Galileo and Newton, who have taught us so much about the way the universe works, were deemed not to have engaged in "high science" simply because their methods did not rely on randomized experiments or program evaluation techniques.

There is no *prima facie* reason why the ratio of natural science methods to social science methods applicable to policing should differ markedly from this ratio in other areas. One can obtain a rough sense of where that ratio lies, in general, by comparing the rate at which new articles are abstracted into various academic citation indices. For the United States, the rate at which articles are being added to the general science citation indices runs at roughly five times the rate at which articles are being added to equivalent social science citation indices.<sup>64</sup> Across a range of industrialized nations, this ratio varies between 5:1 and 10:1. In other words, social science may account for no more than 10 to 20 percent of new science.<sup>65</sup> Given that the elite toolbox and preferred methods of EBP represent a relatively small subset of the overall social science toolkit — certainly less than half — then it might be reasonable to guess that EBP should represent no more than 5 to 10 percent of the investments the police profession could usefully make in scientific inquiry. From this perspective, the notion of EBP playing a central or dominant role in the relationship between police and scholars begins to look woefully unbalanced.

Weisburd and Neyroud do mention the natural sciences and engineering, in passing, but they lump these together under the general rubric of *devices or technologies*, which they say the police are much too eager to adopt. They virtually ignore natural science inquiry mechanisms, normally the larger piece of the scientific pie. W&N do briefly mention crime analysis, commenting positively on some recent advances in its sophistication and versatility. However, they do not seem to seize on crime analysis (as I believe we should) as an example of a different type of science that is more directly relevant to operations. W&N observe little "involvement between scientific work in the universities and the work of crime analysis in policing."<sup>66</sup> Specifically, they complain:

Police departments do not encourage their scientific staff to publish in scientific journals in criminology; indeed they generally discourage them. Science in this

sense is not a part of large policing centers. The implications of this are that the scientific quality of crime analysis units is often relatively low.<sup>67</sup>

In other words, W&N suggest that crime analysis should involve the same type of analytic sophistication as criminological research, and any crime analyst worth his or her salt should be publishing studies in scientific journals. On this point, as on so many others, W&N seem to equate science with criminological research and ignore the significance of inquiry and analytic methods that are perfectly valuable for diagnosing crime problems and guiding operations but lie well outside the realm of evidence-based policing and criminological research.

It is quite a different thing to make the police profession “an arena of evidence-based policies”<sup>68</sup> rather than a sophisticated user of scientific methods. Conflating these purposes may well serve to elevate the status and interests of social scientists but would be disastrous for police. To set things more properly in balance, one might surmise that evidence-based policing, because it is unlikely to meet more than 5 percent of the police profession’s overall scientific needs, should probably receive no more than 5 percent of the funding for police science and a commensurate level of attention.

If such a rule seems remotely reasonable, then the police, along with their scholarly supporters, will need to make a serious commitment to figuring out what mix of investments should constitute the remaining 95 percent of the science agenda because, so far, we have heard less about this part. It is not too hard to identify some of the priorities in this space. The police profession, aided by the scholarly community, should:

- Aim to broaden the range of crime analysis techniques available, beyond the narrow traditions of spatial analysis and CompStat. We should help police understand that problems come in a daunting array of shapes and sizes, and help them to develop the broader analytic versatility required to reveal a broader range of problems and bring them into clearer focus.
- Learn more about the interplay between data-mining and investigative field-craft, so that macro-level analysis and micro-level examination can each inform, refocus and complement the other in a continuous cycle, as police seek to identify and comprehend the complex phenomena they confront.
- Continue to develop intelligence analysis techniques versatile enough to assess local, regional, national and international crime problems (because the security threats that confront police continue to diversify and vary considerably in scale).
- Develop a clearer vision of what might constitute *analytic vigilance* for the profession, learning to avoid “failures of imagination,” knowing how much time and resources to spend on looking, and knowing how to look, even when there might be nothing to find.
- Explore and import a much broader array of pattern recognition techniques to help police spot emerging, invisible and unfamiliar problems earlier and more reliably.
- Define and refine the (several) supporting roles for data analysis, measurement and monitoring during the different phases of the problem-solving process.
- Invest in the quality of analytic support available to operational policing and dramatically increase the availability of analytic services throughout departments.

- Continue the drive to elevate crime analysis and intelligence analysis to the status of a profession,<sup>69</sup> taking care to prevent this emerging discipline from being confused with (or captured by) criminology or the social sciences.

All of these investments would be deeply analytical and could draw on diverse streams of scientific knowledge and scholarship.

### Toward a More Stable and Sustainable Relationship

The relationship between academia and the police profession remains tenuous and vulnerable, but significant progress has been made in developing fruitful collaborations of many types. Scholars have worked with police on political management, organizational design, organizational change, police culture, training, enhancing educational standards within the ranks, and developing analytic methods as well as helping to develop operational strategies and tactics. Scholars have participated in problem-solving projects, chaired inquiries and commissions and have served extensively as consultants to police executives.

All of this is too valuable to jeopardize. Giving evidence-based policing a central position or allowing it to dominate interactions between police and academia may stifle the relationship.

The form of the relationship proposed by proponents of evidence-based policing offers virtually no benefits for police. The best they can hope for is that the scientists they have invited in, after months or years of research work, will finally confirm what police thought they knew already: that an intervention or program the department had previously deployed did actually work. The downside risk for police is much greater. Maybe the research findings will prove to the world that police actions were irrelevant or ineffective and that apparent successes turn out to be bogus or mere luck. For police managers, what joy! No wonder many executives scratch their heads and wonder why they would want to enter into such a partnership. Meanwhile, the scholars offer police no real help with pressing operational needs because they have such a short list of approved methods. The scholars bear no responsibility for the consequences of action or inaction and feel no obligation to invent anything useful. They mostly want to evaluate.

While the benefits for police seem minimal, the costs loom large. Police must proceed more slowly, even in the presence of urgency, in order to satisfy the demands of experimental design. Police agencies must accommodate scholars, providing them access to staff and data, and confronting the legal issues that arise when outsiders are allowed in. Police end up driving the scholars around, keeping them safe, and generally looking after them. Police executives voluntarily subject their own actions and their officers’ actions to scrutiny, dealing with the associated press inquiries and reputational risks. Managers have to persuade their own officers to cooperate with researchers despite their workloads, beliefs and worries about outside scrutiny — a task made no easier if the scholars use condescending phrases such as “high-science” and “elite scientists.” In addition to all of these costs, W&N now propose earmarking “a significant percentage of [a police department’s] budget” for research and evaluation,<sup>70</sup> which would exacerbate tensions over resources even further.

Evidence-based policing does have a place in policing, but it needs to be kept in its rightful place. EBP employs expensive

and complex methodologies that need to be strategically deployed. There are many areas of policing where these methods are not, and will never be, relevant or useful. Problem-oriented policing may well be one such area. EBP should recognize that and simply leave it alone.

There are other areas where EBP's rigorous evaluative techniques seem more appropriate. Where police adopt programs or methods that are expensive, long term, potentially permanent — and which are deployed in a sufficiently standardized way across many departments — evaluating these programs with a reasonable degree of rigor may well be important.<sup>71</sup> With respect to a small number of major programs, EBP may deliver some value. Then again — given the substantial difficulties involved in conducting controlled experiments within a policing context — EBP might extend its disappointing track record, offering valuable insights few and far between.

The profession should not overlook the many other useful contributions that scholars can make and that science can offer. There are many other forms of scientific inquiry, more akin to natural science methods, that need more urgent development within policing. These are more relevant to the bulk of operational policing challenges and should take priority among science investments at this time.

In closing, consider W&N's key question, "How can we move police science to a central place in the policing industry?"<sup>72</sup> Preferably by understanding the particular and limited contributions that social science research methods can make to operational policing, and by embracing a substantially broader range of investigative, analytic, inquiry and intelligence techniques more generally suited to the operational demands of the profession.

### Endnotes

1. Weisburd, David and Peter Neyroud, "Police Science: Toward a New Paradigm," paper of the Second Harvard Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2010.
2. *Ibid.*, 2.
3. *Ibid.*, 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 3.
5. *Ibid.*, 3.
6. *Ibid.*, 6.
7. *Ibid.*, 19.
8. *Ibid.*, 9-10.
9. *Ibid.*, 10-11.
10. *Ibid.*, 1.
11. *Ibid.*, 1.
12. *Ibid.*, 26-27, table 1.
13. *Ibid.*, 7.
14. Weisburd and Neyroud have claimed, in response to initial drafts of this paper, that their paper presents a broader view of *police science* and a more nuanced view of the proposed relationship between scholars and police than we normally hear from the champions of EBP. Indeed, they do mention in passing, and label as *scientific methods*, a considerable range of innovations in technology and analysis, including problem-oriented policing, CompStat, intelligence-led policing, and crime analysis more generally. Nevertheless, they use the phrase *evidence-based* no less than 20 times (followed by *policing*, *practice(s)*, *policy(ies)*,

*model*, *approach*, *profession*, *research*, and *science*) and state rather plainly in their opening sentence that the goal is to make policing "an arena of evidence-based policies." W&N refer to the type of science that the police profession needs as an "elite" science (21), a "blue-chip" science (23), and a "high-level" science (25). These characterizations echo EBP's emphasis on professional social-scientific evaluation techniques and scholarly criminological research. Thus, the W&N paper seems closely aligned with the core themes of the evidence-based policing movement.

15. Sherman, Lawrence W., "Ideas in American Policing: Evidence-Based Policing," Washington, DC: Police Foundation, July 1998, 3.
16. *Ibid.*, 3-4.
17. Lindblom, Charles E., *Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempts to Understand and Shape Society*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990: preface, vii.
18. *Ibid.*, 11.
19. Moore, Mark H., "Improving Police Through Expertise, Experience, and Experiments," in *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, ed. David Weisburd and Anthony Braga, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 325.
20. Moore, Mark H. "Learning While Doing: Linking Knowledge to Policy in the Development of Community Policing and Violence Prevention in the United States," in *Integrating Crime Prevention Strategies: Propensity and Opportunity*, ed. Per-Olof H. Wikstrom, Ronald V. Clarke et al., Stockholm, Sweden: National Council of Crime Prevention, 1995: 301-331.
21. Moore, "Learning While Doing," 302-303.
22. *Ibid.*, 310.
23. Sparrow, Malcolm K., *The Character of Harms: Operational Challenges in Control*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 8-9.
24. Moore, "Learning While Doing," 307.
25. For this purpose, single group pretest/posttest designs are perfectly adequate, whereas these are regarded as "inadequate and uninterpretable" by the experimentalists. See "Standards of Evaluations in Problem-Oriented Policing Projects: Good Enough?" in *Evaluating Crime Reduction Initiatives*, ed. Johannes Knutsson and Nick Tilley, Crime Prevention Studies Book Series, vol. 24, Monsey, NY, 2009: 21, 23.
26. Eck, John E., "Learning From Experience in Problem-Oriented Policing and Situational Prevention: The Positive Functions of Weak Evaluations and the Negative Functions of Strong Ones," in *Evaluation of Crime Prevention*, ed. Nick Tilley, Crime Prevention Studies Book Series, vol. 14, Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2002: 109.
27. For a detailed exploration of the differences between functions, processes and problems and the implications for agency operations, see chapter 2, "A Different Type of Work," in Sparrow, *The Character of Harms*, 47-72.
28. I refer to this elsewhere as the *whack-a-mole* model for risk control operations; see Sparrow, *The Character of Harms*, 143-146.
29. Nick Tilley points out that, in asking "what works," the *what* can refer to particular interventions, classes of interventions, mechanisms, strategies, or other more complex combinations of the four. He stresses the need to be clear

- about which level of object one is evaluating. See Tilley, Nick, "What's the 'What' in 'What Works?' Health, Policing and Crime Prevention," in Knutsson and Tilley, eds., *Evaluating Crime Reduction Initiatives*, 121-145.
30. Braga, Anthony A. and Brenda J. Bond, "Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial," *Criminology* 46 (3) (2008): 585.
  31. Weisburd, David, Cody W. Telep, Joshua C. Hinkle and John E. Eck, "Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective in Reducing Crime and Disorder? Findings From a Campbell Systematic Review," *Criminology & Public Policy* 9 (1) (2010): 139-172.
  32. Such reviews follow the protocols of the Campbell Collaboration and focus on experimental and quasi-experimental studies. See <http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/>, accessed on October 6, 2010.
  33. Weisburd et al., "Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective," 153.
  34. Vote-counting essentially grants one vote to each study incorporated into a meta-analysis. Tallying the votes provides an overall score indicating whether a specific intervention produces positive outcomes more often than not, according to the compiled evidence. It is generally regarded as an unsophisticated approach because it makes no corrections for the relative sizes and quality of the different experiments. However, when researchers aim to combine the results from several studies involving *different* interventions (as is the case with Weisburd's Campbell Review), any of the more sophisticated *statistical* techniques for combining outcomes might be regarded as mathematically inappropriate, and vote-counting might seem more reasonable in these circumstances.
  35. Weisburd et al., "Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective," 153.
  36. *Ibid.*, 159.
  37. *Ibid.*, 164.
  38. Pawson, Ray and Nick Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*, London: Sage Publications, 1997: 50. For a discussion of growing dissatisfaction among scholars with prevailing approaches to evaluation and evidence — spanning medicine, education, early childhood programs, and international development, see Smyth, Katya Fels and Lisbeth B. Schorr, "A Lot to Lose: A Call to Rethink What Constitutes 'Evidence' in Finding Social Interventions That Work," Working Paper Series, Cambridge, MA: Malcolm Weiner Center for Social Policy, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, January 2009. Accessed September 29, 2010, at [lisbethschorr.org/doc/Alottolosejan.2009.pdf](http://lisbethschorr.org/doc/Alottolosejan.2009.pdf).
  39. Weisburd et al., "Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective," 140.
  40. *Ibid.*, 164. An earlier study by Weisburd and Eck, designed to test the efficacy of various policing strategies, drew the same essential conclusion: "[T]he authors find that many policing practices applied broadly throughout the United States either have not been the subject of systematic research or have been examined in the context of research designs that do not allow practitioners or policy makers to draw very strong conclusions" (42). See Weisburd, David and John E. Eck, "What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 593 (May 2004): 42-65.
  41. Paquet, Gilles, *Crippling Epistemologies and Governance Failures: A Plea for Experimentalism*, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: University of Ottawa Press, 2009: xv.
  42. Nearby residents might have intervened if they had known what was happening.
  43. Braga and Bond, "Policing Crime," 577-607.
  44. *Ibid.*, 598.
  45. *Ibid.*, 599.
  46. For a detailed discussion of the dimensionality of problems and the implications for control strategies, see chapter 4, "Defining Problems: Picking the Dimensions," in Sparrow, *The Character of Harms*, 93-100.
  47. Weisburd et al., "Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective," 147. The study also located six quasi-experimental designs, and four of these were also place-based. The remaining two quasi-experiments focused on probationers and parolees, respectively, who are presumably more easily subjected to experimental manipulation than other segments of the public.
  48. Paquet, *Crippling Epistemologies*, xvii.
  49. Pawson and Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*, 57.
  50. Discussion at Harvard Law School, moderated by Professor Philip Heymann and Mathea Falco, January 30, 2009.
  51. Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961: 5. Quoted in Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change*, 161-162.
  52. Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change*, 137.
  53. The term *randomistas* appeared first in the field of international development economics, where it applies to those who consider randomized controlled trials (RCT) to be the gold standard when it comes to determining intervention effects.
  54. This approach stems from the work of Cook and Campbell in 1979. See Cook, T.D. and D.T. Campbell, *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979. In 1998, a formal scale, now known as the *Maryland Scientific Methods Scale*, was laid out in Sherman, L.W., D.C. Gottfredson, D.L. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter and S.D. Bushway, *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*, Research in Brief, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, July 1998, NCJ 17176. A more recent version of the scale is laid out in Welsh, Brandon C., "Evidence-Based Crime Prevention: Scientific Basis, Trends, Results and Implications for Canada," Research Report 2007-1, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: National Crime Prevention Centre, Public Safety, June 2007, 13-14.
  55. Welsh, "Evidence-Based Crime Prevention," 15.
  56. *Ibid.*, 5.
  57. Jim Manzi observes that therapeutic biology "could often rely on the assumption of uniform biological response to generalize findings from randomized trials" but that "higher causal densities in social sciences" make such generalizations "hazardous." See Manzi, Jim, "What Social Science Does — and Doesn't — Know," *City Journal*, Summer 2010. Accessed September 29, 2010, at <http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php?id=6330>.
  58. In fact, the commercial sector seems to have figured out some ways to prevent the FDA from properly monitoring the trials. Most of the trials are now conducted offshore, where the FDA cannot and does not supervise them.

- Roughly 80 percent of approved marketing applications for drugs and biologics contain data from foreign clinical trials, and more than half of clinical trial subjects were located overseas. The FDA inspects only 0.7 percent of foreign clinical trial sites. See Levinson, Daniel, "Challenge to FDA's Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials," Report OEI-01-08-00510, Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, June 2010: ii.
59. Black, Nick, "Evidence Based Policy: Proceed With Care," *British Medical Journal* 323 (August 4, 2001): 275.
  60. The youth homicide rate involves victims ages 24 and younger, and the juvenile homicide rate, involves victims ages 17 and younger.
  61. For a full account of the project, see Kennedy, David M., Anne M. Piehl and Anthony A. Braga, "Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59 (1) (Winter 1996): 147-196. For a subsequent analysis of pre/post data and comparisons with the trajectory of youth homicide rates in other cities, see Braga, Anthony A., David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring and Anne Morrison Piehl, "Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 38 (2001): 195-225.
  62. Christakis does use techniques from social network analysis, which arose first as a subdiscipline of social science. However, social science has no monopoly on the uses and applications of the core ideas from social network analysis. In fact, mathematicians had been studying networks, which they called "graphs," for several hundred years before social science began to realize their significance for the study of social phenomena.
  63. Interview with Professor Christakis, reported in Gudrais, Elizabeth, "Networked: Exploring the Weblike Structures That Underlie Everything From Friendship to Cellular Behavior," *Harvard Magazine*, May-June 2010, 50.
  64. See, for example, "Articles Abstracted to the Thomson-Reuters and Scopus Databases, 2007," *World Social Science Report 2010*, Annex 1, which are basic statistics on production of the social sciences.
  65. This is a crude proxy, of course, for the rate of use of various inquiry methods because the categorization of articles is based heavily on the field of study as well as the research methods used.
  66. Weisburd and Neyroud, "Police Science," 11.
  67. *Ibid.*, 12.
  68. *Ibid.*, 1.
  69. This cause was championed for many years by the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA).
  70. Weisburd and Neyroud, "Police Science," table at 26-27, and comment at 27.
  71. For a discussion of the circumstances affecting the costs and benefits of strong and weak evaluations, see Eck, "Learning from Experience," 93-117.
  72. Weisburd and Neyroud, "Police Science," 18.

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## NAPE LISTSERV AND WEBSITE

Members of the National Association of Probation Executives should feel free to use the NAPE Listserv to pose questions or share information about relevant topics in the administration of community corrections agencies. Members wishing to send out information on this exclusive service may address emails to [nape\\_members@shsu.edu](mailto:nape_members@shsu.edu).

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## THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE: UNNOTICED BUT NOT UNEVENTFUL

by

Ed Barajas

The most important social trend of the past 20 years has many experts baffled: The United States' plunging crime rate.

The homicide rate fell 51 percent between 1991 and 2010, from 9.8 per 100,000 residents to 4.8 per 100,000. Property crime also fell sharply during that time. Auto theft, once an almost accepted menace of urban life, dropped an astounding 64 percent. According to an FBI report these trends continued in the first half of 2011.

Americans also report being less fearful of crime. According to Gallup, 37 percent of Americans say they fear walking alone at night within a mile of their homes. This is down from 48 percent three decades ago.

Most criminal justice experts are at a loss to explain the precise causes of crime's decline. Some observations defy conventional wisdom such as lower crime in the middle of tough economic conditions. Increasing incarceration gives a partial explanation. But crime rates continued to fall after December 31, 2008, when incarceration peaked at about 1.5 million.

It seems clear that many have underestimated Americans' capacity to tackle a seemingly uncontrollable problem and fix it. For the past 20 years there's been a quiet revolution occurring in criminal justice seemingly beyond the view, and perhaps the grasp, of many experts. What's at the heart of the remarkable drop in crime is the transition from the traditional criminal justice system to a new criminal justice model.

The traditional criminal justice model is composed of several semi-autonomous justice institutions designed to process cases at several points within each agency. This "system" has no cohesive overarching common mission, principles, and values. Policy formulation hinges on the passage of new laws at the Federal and State levels.

By contrast, the new criminal justice is about the justice system working collaboratively with each other and with citizens to solve common problems at the neighborhood level. What drives the new criminal justice is a shared mission of creating and maintaining safer communities by problem solving. There's a focus on local problems and on local solutions. What's occurring is more than the "next best thing" in justice practice but a true paradigm shift. This new paradigm creates interdependence between each agency in order to solve common problems rather than merely process cases.

One important new element is the role of citizens and local business owners. Citizens play a central part by working in partnership with the system in helping to address problems and helping to craft solutions. This is a change from the traditional model that often views citizens as punitive-minded and useful only in terms of buying into new programs and laws crafted by politicians. This disconnect is caused by citizens, feeling ignored by the system, expressing their anger and frustration at their perception of a true "criminal" justice system. The traditional response has been to pass tough on crime sentencing laws that spark a backlash from reformers calling for less punitive policies. This creates the never-ending pendulum swings between tough on crime policies versus more leniencies.

The effort has always been to reform the system. What's occurring now is an effort to transform it. Reform efforts have failed to achieve favor with the public because they focus on the wrong problem. Criminal justice reform is almost always focused on incarceration and the means to reduce it. There are constant calls for more alternatives to incarceration despite the fact that more than two thirds of our corrections population is already on community supervision (alternatives) rather than locked up. Out of more than 7 million people under correctional supervision, more than 5 million are on probation and parole. The rest are in prisons and jails. The demand on the system has thus been to do what it's already doing.

The real problem with the system is that it's reactive rather than proactive. Its focus is on responses to individual acts of criminal behavior rather than on strategies to tackle crime. The police were the first to understand the importance of proactive practices. The result was problem-oriented or community policing. The other justice agencies have now adopted these transformative practices. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the courts, probation, prosecution, and even prisons and jails.

### Court Innovations

A prime example of the new justice system is the Midtown Community Court in Manhattan. In the 1980's Midtown Manhattan was in the grip of escalating criminal violence and urban decay. There was a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness among citizens and business owners regarding solutions. This was a perfect example of the notion put forth by J. K. Stewart in 1986 that crime causes poverty rather than the other way around. As crime and disorder increase, people stay away from the effected communities and deprive businesses of customers, thereby forcing many to close thereby destroying jobs and reducing the tax base leading to a reduction in services, etc.

The Times Square Business Improvement District (BID) composed of local business owners, teamed up with the court system in New York City to establish the Midtown Community Court. The court was set up specifically to address quality of life crimes such as aggressive panhandling, public urination, street prostitution and drug dealing. This gave the NYPD a further incentive to continue to pursue its new strategy, adopted by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton, of addressing these types of offenses.

The court was established within the neighborhood it served and provided swift accountability to offenders. Sanctions were reparative in nature, consisting of cleaning up graffiti and other signs of urban decay. The court provided an array of health and social services within the premises in order to help offenders transition to crime free lives. The city's sanitation department helped supervise offenders assigned community service. Members of BID sat on the court's advisory board and provided valuable policy input.

This collaborative strategy had other ancillary benefits. The police found that many suspects arrested for low-level offences were carrying weapons or narcotics. Many had outstanding warrants for more serious offences. In 1996, John Royster was arrested for brutal attacks on four women over a period of several days. The crime might not have been solved but for the fact that fingerprints recovered at one of the crime scenes matched those taken from Royster when he was arrested three months earlier for a low-level offense of jumping a subway turnstile.

The Midtown Community Court continues its work within a transformed neighborhood where crime has decreased dramatically. Other "problem-solving courts" have been established in other districts. At the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn the prosecutor and defense lawyer are part of the same team working on the long-term best interest of individual defendants and the community. This is truly a radical departure from the litigation-based adversarial approach characterizing the traditional criminal justice model.

### The New Probation

Another justice component in the midst of transformation is probation. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, probation is the most crowded corrections component with more than four million offenders under supervision. Probation departments struggle with a burdensome mix of escalating caseloads and diminishing resources. This has forced probation to rethink its mission and reinvent its practices.

Probation is an alternative to incarceration. The traditional mission of probation is primarily that of an advocate for offenders to help them comply with court orders that will keep them out of prison. Probation officers often refer to offenders on their caseloads as "clients." This singular focus on offenders caused probation to lose favor with the public and become ineffectual in terms of public safety.

In the 1990s many probation officials began to embrace a new concept of probation. They saw probation's mission, not only as providing services to offenders but in broader terms of doing justice, serving victims, and protecting the community. A new type of probation practice evolved under the umbrella of what came to be called community justice. In 2000, the American Probation and Parole Association put forth a position statement on community justice. The position statement is perhaps the most comprehensive interpretation of the new justice paradigm. It defines community justice as:

... a strategic method of crime reduction and prevention, which builds or enhances partnerships within communities.

It describes its modus operandi as that of:

... confront(ing) crime and delinquency through proactive, problem-solving practices aimed at prevention, control, reduction and reparation of the harm crime has caused.

Building on this model, the probation department in Quincy, Massachusetts, decided to address domestic violence and break the cycle of violence by viewing victims as primary clients. They now view domestic violence not only as a crime against the victim but also a crime against the community. Besides offering batterer-specific treatment to the offender, probation officers work

with the police and other agencies to identify and respond to instances of domestic violence. Probation officers do not hesitate to revoke offenders who violate "no contact" orders, even for the slightest infraction. This helps to guarantee that the batterer will not manipulate or intimidate his way back into the home and increase the level of violence.

Operation Nightlight, in a troubled section of Boston, was formed as a joint venture of the Boston Police Department and the Probation Department of the Dorchester Court. Police and probation officers work jointly to address community concerns related to youth violence. Joint patrols check for curfew and other violations of probation. Officers work with parents to help them reassert parental control. Schools, churches, and other community institutions also help supervise juvenile offenders.

### Prosecution Innovation

Prosecution has been transformed in the past 20 years through community prosecution. A pioneer in community prosecution was the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office in Portland, Oregon. In 1990, the office established a Neighborhood District Attorney (NBDA) unit in direct response to citizens and business groups concerned with neighborhood safety. The unit works with police, citizens, and social services to address quality of life offenses.

In Denver, Colorado, the District Attorney's Office works with community justice councils composed of residents, teachers, school administrators, business owners, and faith leaders to identify problems and devise solutions. One of the benefits is that some quality of life issues are resolved without formal action by the state or city prosecutor.

Community prosecutors in various jurisdictions have succeeded in closing down drug houses. They work to evict gang members from their dwellings thereby disrupting their activities. The justice components working in concert with each other and with the community for a common purpose creates a vital energy that can confront and subdue crime.

### New Management for Prisons and Jails

Experts have long predicted that our overcrowded prisons would soon erupt into violence in a rash of disturbances. In fact, just the opposite has happened. Prisons have become much more peaceful in the past 30 years. Better staff training and inmate classification systems have dramatically decreased prison homicides. Between 1980 and 2003 the state prison homicide rate dropped from 54.0 per 100,000 inmates to an astounding 5.7 per 100,000. Better architectural design of facilities has also made Attica type uprisings virtually a thing of the past.

In the 1970s the Federal Bureau of Prisons pioneered the use of a new type of institutional design called the direct supervision model. This model has now spread throughout the correctional system. Direct supervision borrows heavily from the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design or CPTED (pronounced sep-ted).

CPTED focuses on creating crime-free environments in public places and direct supervision strives for the same thing at the institution level. The institution is divided up into manageable units each with its own staff. The focus is on managing the environment rather than on controlling the inmates. One might say it is a microcosm of community-oriented policing in prison



and jail. Officers are in constant and direct contact with inmates and get to know them so they can respond to trouble before it escalates into violence. Negotiation and communication become more important staff skills than brute strength.

This has contributed to safer and more humane environments within prisons and jails. Between 1983 and 2002 jail suicide rates dropped 64 percent. State prison suicide rates, historically much lower than the rate in jails, dropped from 34 per 100,000 inmates to 14 per 100,000 during the same period.

### Does Recidivism Matter?

The new criminal justice challenges one of the most sacrosanct elements of the traditional criminal justice — namely the issue of recidivism and the question regarding its relevance as a success measure. If the purpose of the system is to keep people out of prison, recidivism is a valid success measure. If the purpose is community safety it is not.

We know that a person can avoid incarceration for a variety of reasons, including victim intimidation, while continuing to wreak havoc in the community. Relying on recidivism also has unintended consequences. Probation and parole officers are often instructed not to revoke anyone unless or until they commit a serious offence such as murder or assault. Many serious offences could be prevented by revoking certain habitual offenders, such as chronic domestic abusers, at the first sign of trouble such as a minor violation. To do so, however, would be considered a failure in the traditional system. Community justice recognizes that reducing recidivism and reducing victimization are not one and the same.

New success measures still need to be articulated and formalized. These could include violence and other crime reduction, restitution paid to victims, and public perceptions of safety as well as satisfaction with the justice system.

### Transformation Continues

Critics continue to view the effects of innovative practices through an old lens. They believe that increased arrests for “qual-

ity of life” offenses may increase incarceration as well as yield greater power and authority to the state.

In the traditional model the police, indeed the entire justice system, are viewed as a necessary evil by many academics and scholars. This is perhaps in keeping with American tradition. Our founders, ever mindful of governments’ tendency to encroach on civil liberties, ensured that individual rights as well as the means to defend against the abuse of state power were codified in our constitution.

What’s important to understand is that the new criminal justice is not about increasing the power of the state. It’s about diffusing its power among the justice components as well as the community. Most importantly it’s about increasing the voice of citizens and victims. Citizens who support the system with taxes are entitled to demand a good return on their investment.

The irony that’s lost on so many experts is that the traditional model is dependent on passing more laws or amending existing ones at the legislative level. The new criminal justice usually requires that justice agencies merely adopt a new mission and change their operating principles and practices. These changes are often crafted with the participation of citizens, victims, and local businesses.

Criminal justice transformation has been occurring seemingly beyond the ken of many academics, scholars and social pundits. The people and the justice system have teamed up to solve common problems. It’s a case of the people being ahead of the experts. Perhaps that’s been the problem. Experts have all the answers. We’re finally beginning to ask the right questions.

Ed Barajas, a freelance writer living in North Carolina, is retired from the Federal Bureau of Prisons after 27 years of service. He was a Correctional Program Specialist with the National Institute of Corrections in Washington, D. C., from 1989 to 2001. While at the Bureau of Prisons he worked as a Community Corrections Manager for five years and in various federal penitentiaries.

## NAPE EVENTS IN INDIANAPOLIS

Plan to attend the annual events of the National Association of Probation Executives in Indianapolis, Indiana, at the J. W. Marriott Hotel on August 11-12, 2012, immediately prior to the 37<sup>th</sup> Annual Training Institute of the American Probation and Parole Association. The schedule of events is as follows:

### NAPE Members Reception

Saturday, August 11, 2012  
5:00 to 7:00 PM

### NAPE Awards Breakfast

Sunday, August 12, 2012  
8:00 to 10:30 AM

During the Awards Breakfast, the *Sam Houston State University Executive of the Year Award*, the *George M. Keiser Award*

for *Exceptional Leadership*, and the *Dan Richard Beto Award* will be presented.

### NAPE Board of Directors Meeting

Sunday, August 12, 2012  
10:30 AM to 12:00 PM

The rooms for these events have yet to be assigned. Once the rooms have been identified, a notice will be sent to NAPE members from the Secretariat, along with a RSVP form. In addition, information will be available at the hotel and in the APPA program booklet.

For people who have not visited Indianapolis, they will be pleasantly surprised. Indianapolis has something for everyone — excellent restaurants, museums, historic sites, activities for children — all within easy access of the hotel.

## ON THE VALUE OF SETTING STRETCH TARGETS

by

Robert D. Behn, Ph.D.

Eric Shinseki and Shaun Donovan are certifiably crazy. Shinseki is secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs; Donovan is secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Together they and their departments have set out to reduce veterans' homelessness.

Actually, they want to do more than *reduce* veterans' homelessness. A couple of years ago, they decided that, by the end of 2015, they would *eliminate* veterans' homelessness.

That's a true "performance target." It includes both a number (zero) and a date (December 31, 2015).

It is also a "stretch target." VA and HUD will be unable to hit this target simply by continuing with business as usual. A "stretch target" is one that the organization cannot achieve simply by working a little harder or a little smarter. To achieve a stretch target, people have to invent new strategies, new incentives — entirely new ways of achieving their purpose.

In January 2009, the U.S. had 75,609 homeless veterans. A year later, the number was up slightly to 76,329. By January 2011, however, the number was down 12 percent to 67,495.

Oops. You don't need a spread sheet, a graph, or an advanced degree in mathematics to figure out that this trend isn't good enough. If VA and HUD reduce the number of homeless veterans by 9,000 each year, it will take them until 2017 to get the number to zero. Moreover, for 2012, reducing the number by another 9,000 will be more difficult than last year's achievement.

Whenever an organization sets out to accomplish a big task, it breaks it down into small tasks and starts with the easiest ones. Such a strategy of small wins makes perfect sense. With each small win, the organization demonstrates progress. With each small win, it develops the confidence that it can accomplish something significant. Moreover, through a series of small wins, it learns what works, what doesn't — and in what circumstances.

Thus, the knowledge and confidence gained by reducing the number of homeless veterans by 9,000 can be employed to reduce the number by more than 9,000 in future years.

Of course, Shinseki and Donovan are lucky. They identified a public purpose with which no one disagrees. No interest group is lobbying Congress to create more homeless veterans. If Gallup took a poll, 95 percent of the respondents would say that the number of homeless veterans should be zero. (The other 5 percent, would not understand the question and would simply answer, "Huh?")

Still, luck is recognizing it. And Shinseki and Donovan were smart enough to recognize their luck. They recognized that they had an important purpose that no one opposed. They recognized that they had a purpose that would mobilize people in their departments plus collaborators: state and local governments, nonprofits, and individual citizens.

They recognized that their purpose required them to set neither a process target nor an output target but an outcome target. They recognized that their purpose was precise enough — focused on a specific, well-defined, identifiable group of people — to make this outcome target achievable.

They also recognized that achieving their purpose was a complex task. They recognized that, to achieve their purpose, they

had both to identify and help veterans who needed housing, and to identify and help veterans who were in danger of becoming homeless. Not only would VA and HUD have to invent new strategies, so would their collaborators.

Shinseki and Donovan recognized not just their luck but also their danger. After all, all performance targets are dangerous. They create the obvious opportunity for a well-defined failure. And stretch targets are doubly dangerous, for the chance of a big win seems so small, while the chance of a big, public failure looms so large.

While president of GE, Jack Welch is credited with coining the stretch target concept and the phrase. "We have found that by reaching for what appears to be the impossible, we often actually do the impossible; and even when we don't quite make it, we inevitably wind up doing much better than we would have done."

In business, if you miss a stretch target but still do "much better," you will win kudos. In government, however, missing a publicly declared target of any size simply invites criticism and attack.

Still, a stretch target creates purpose. A stretch target that is directly connected to the organization's purpose invigorates and mobilizes people in a way that no ordinary target can. It connects their every-day work to something significant. As Welch observed: "Stretch targets energize."

Shinseki and Donovan may be certifiably crazy. Indeed, for government executives who seek to achieve significant public purposes and who thus establish stretch targets, that may be an essential component of the job description.

**Robert D. Behn, Ph.D.**, a lecturer at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, chairs the executive education program "Driving Government Performance: Leadership Strategies that Produce Results." He is working on a book tentatively titled *The PerformanceStat Potential*. This article is a reproduction of the December 2011 (Vol. 10, No. 4) issue of *Bob Behn's Performance Leadership Report*. It is reprinted with permission. Copyright © by Robert D. Behn.

## NEWS FROM THE FIELD

### SANTA BARBARA COUNTY CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER PATTI STEWART RETIRES

After close to three decades of service, **Patti Stewart** retired in December 2011 as Chief Probation Officer of the Santa Barbara County Probation Department in California.

Stewart was hired as a deputy probation officer in October 1982 and served in all operational divisions of the department as she worked her way up through the ranks. She has received numerous awards and commendations but is particularly proud of receiving the H. Thomas Guerry Award for Outstanding Performance, being selected as a Community Hero by the Santa Barbara County Education Office and Cox Cable, and receiving recognition as a Distinguished Alumni of Guadalupe Union School.

In 1993 she was chosen to supervise an armed intensive supervision unit, and in 1996 worked in the grant-funded Multi-Agency System of Care. As the first female appointed to the role, she directed operations of the Los Prietos Boys Camp for more than eight years and oversaw the building and implementation of the former Tri Counties Boot Camp and the development of the Los Prietos Boys Academy. In 2004, she was promoted to the rank of Deputy Chief over probation institutions.

After a statewide recruitment, in May 2007, Stewart was appointed by the Superior Court as Chief Probation Officer. In January 2011, she accepted the nomination as the Southern Region Chair of the Chief Probation Officers of California, and also served on the executive committee of the organization. Locally, she chaired the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council and the Community Corrections Partnership.

During her tenure a head of the department a number of innovative programs were instituted.

### JENKINS HONORED IN SAN DIEGO

According to an article by **Chris Nichols** appearing in the *North County Times*, NAPE Secretary **Mack Jenkins**, San Diego County Chief Probation Officer, was named 2011's Law Enforcement Official of the Year by the San Diego Crime Commission. The nonprofit San Diego County Crime Commission presented Jenkins with the award in October 2011 to recognize his leadership in planning for what is considered a seismic shift in the local criminal justice system.

Jenkins led county plans to take on thousands of extra offenders from the state, a move dubbed "realignment" that results from California's overcrowded prisons. His department expects to monitor an additional 2,000 offenders above the 14,000 it already monitors.

"I was absolutely thrilled (to receive the award), not as much for myself but because it was recognition for probation and what probation officers do," Jenkins said. He added that his department is "at the forefront of the biggest criminal justice change in decades."

Past recipients of the award include San Diego County District Attorney **Bonnie Dumanis** and former San Diego County Sheriff **Bill Kolender**.

The San Diego County Crime Commission presents the law enforcement award annually. Its former chairman said Jenkins'

selection gained strong support. "We don't go by politics. We go by merit," said **Charles Kopp**, the former chairman. "The whole (law enforcement) industry was behind this."

### NEW DIRECTOR IN LEWIS COUNTY, NEW YORK

In January 2012 Lewis County Legislators voted unanimously to appoint longtime probation officer **Mary Jo Burkhard** as Director of the Lewis County Probation Department in Lowville, New York, pending the results of a Civil Service exam.

"Mary Jo has been a probation officer for 31 years, during which she has become familiar and experienced in all facets of probation program services," Legislator **John O. Boyd**, Chairman of the Courts and Law Committee, said in a short prepared statement. "Since 1987, she has served as the staff development officer responsible for assigning staff to appropriate training programs."

Burkhard replaces her longtime boss, **Randall A. Schell**, who retired at the end of 2011 after nearly 36 years with the Probation Department, the last 25 as Director.

In November Schell ran unopposed for Lowville Town Supervisor and has since assumed that position. He replaced **Arleigh D. Rice**, who served in that post for the past 20 years.

### TOWNSEND NAMED TJJD EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

In January 2012 members of the Executive Board of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) elected **Cherie Townsend** as their new Executive Director. Townsend, former Executive Director of the Texas Youth Commission, will be responsible in leading the agency through reform and to establish a new culture fully in line with the mission and goals of S.B. 653.

Townsend has recorded a distinguished career in the juvenile justice arena. She has served as Director of Juvenile Services for Clark County, Nevada, and as Chief Juvenile Probation Officer for Maricopa County, Arizona. In addition, she has been a member of the faculty of the Executive Development Program, a joint initiative of the National Institute of Corrections, National Association of Probation Executives, and the Correctional Management Institute of Texas at Sam Houston State University. Townsend, who has received a number of awards and recognitions for her leadership in community corrections, is a past President of the National Association of Probation Executives.

### NEW CHIEF APPOINTED IN SOLANO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

**Christopher Hansen** has been named the new Chief Probation Officer for Solano County, according to an announcement from the Solano County Board of Supervisors and the Solano County Superior Court. Hansen previously served as the Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the District of Nevada in Las Vegas. He replaces **Isabelle Voit**, who recently retired.

## Executive Exchange

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Presiding Judge **Paul Beeman** lauded Hansen as bringing “a wealth of experience” to the job. “With his breadth of work experience and education, I believe he will provide the leadership needed to continue our excellent work in the adult and juvenile probation programs,” Beeman said.

Hansen started his career as a probation officer in the Florida Department of Corrections in 1983. He joined the U.S. Probation Office in 1989, working his way up the ranks to supervising probation officer in Fort Myers and Naples, Florida. He moved to Nevada in 2003.

Hansen has a doctorate in education from Nova Southeastern University. He also has a master’s degree in criminology and a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from the University of South Florida. He is an online undergraduate and graduate level instructor with Walden University in Minnesota and with Saint Leo University in Florida.

### NEW CHIEF IN NORTH CAROLINA

In a February 2012 ceremonial session of the U.S. District Court in Raleigh, James Corpening, Jr., was sworn in as Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern District of North Carolina.

Corpening is responsible for the administration and management of the district’s 44 counties and six offices located in Raleigh, Wilmington, Greenville, Wilson, New Bern, and Jacksonville. The district’s 92 employees work in the supervision unit, court services unit, information technology, administrative support or human resources.

The new Chief received a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He earned a doctorate degree at North Carolina State University.

### PROBATION CHIEF IN WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS, RETIRES

After 32 years of exemplary service, **Marty Griffith**, Director of the Williamson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department in Georgetown, Texas, retired at the end of March 2012.

When Griffith started work with the department in September 1979, he was one of only six employees. The county was smaller then, as well, with a population of only about 75,000, and Griffith estimates there were no more than a couple hundred people on probation at any given time. Now, Williamson County’s population tops 420,000, with approximately 5,000 people on probation. As for Griffith’s office, he says there are now 136 dedicated professionals within the department.

### NEW CHIEF IN IMPERIAL COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

In February 2012 the Imperial County Board of Supervisors and the Superior Court Judges named Benny G. Benavidez its new probation department leader.

Benavidez is returning to the Imperial County Probation Department after being with the California Department of Corrections for more than 25 years. The El Centro resident started his

criminal justice career in 1977 as a group supervisor for the Imperial County Probation Department.

Benavidez says he is honored by the appointment stating, “I want to thank the Superior Court Judges and the Board of Supervisors for their support and confidence in me. I look forward to working with the all the fine individuals at probation.”

The new Chief is also a correctional science instructor at Imperial Valley College. He attended Central Union High School, Imperial Valley College, San Diego State University, and Western State University, College of Law.

Superior Court Judge **William Lehman** said the Judges selected Benavidez because he has the knowledge and experience necessary to be the Chief Probation Officer.

### BUTTE COUNTY NAMES NEW CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER

In February 2012 **Steven K. Bordin** was hired as Chief Probation Officer for Butte County, California, following the retirement last year of **John Wardell**.

Bordin has served as Chief Probation Officer in Colusa County for the past ten years, and was a probation officer and supervising probation officer in Butte County prior to that.

He has resided in Butte County for the past 17 years, and is an active volunteer with the Chico Boys and Girls Club. Bordin earned a bachelor’s degree from Chico State University in 1998.

# NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROBATION EXECUTIVES

## Who We Are

Founded in 1981, the National Association of Probation Executives is a professional organization representing the chief executive officers of local, county and state probation agencies. NAPE is dedicated to enhancing the professionalism and effectiveness in the field of probation by creating a national network for probation executives, bringing about positive change in the field, and making available a pool of experts in probation management, program development, training and research.

## Why Join

The National Association of Probation Executives offers you the chance to help build a national voice and power base for the field of probation and serves as your link with other probation leaders. Join with us and make your voice heard.

## Types of Membership

**Regular:** Regular members must be employed full-time in an executive capacity by a probation agency or association. They must have at least two levels of professional staff under their supervision or be defined as executives by the director or chief probation officer of the agency.

**Organizational:** Organizational memberships are for probation and community corrections agencies. Any member organization may designate up to five administrative employees to receive the benefits of membership.

**Corporate:** Corporate memberships are for corporations doing business with probation and community corrections agencies or for individual sponsors.

**Honorary:** Honorary memberships are conferred by a two-thirds vote of the NAPE Board of Directors in recognition of an outstanding contribution to the field of probation or for special or long-term meritorious service to NAPE.

**Subscriber:** Subscribers are individuals whose work is related to the practice of probation.

## Membership Application

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

AGENCY \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

TELEPHONE # \_\_\_\_\_ FAX # \_\_\_\_\_ E-MAIL \_\_\_\_\_

DATE OF APPLICATION \_\_\_\_\_

<i>CHECK</i>	Regular	<input type="checkbox"/> \$ 50 / 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/> \$95 / 2 years	<input type="checkbox"/> \$140 / 3 years
	Organizational	<input type="checkbox"/> \$ 250 / 1 year		
	Corporate	<input type="checkbox"/> \$ 500 / 1 year		

Please make check payable to **THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROBATION EXECUTIVES** and mail to:  
 NAPE Secretariat, ATTN: Christie Davidson, Correctional Management Institute of Texas, George J. Beto Criminal Justice Center,  
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas 77341-2296  
 (936) 294-3757

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# NAPE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROBATION EXECUTIVES

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